A Yom Kippur War Repeat? The Self Serving Conceptzia - by Dr. Aaron Lerner

Suffice it to say that in the absence of the "conceptzia", the potential consequences associated with letting Hezbollah or Hamas pick the time and place of the next major round far outweigh the costs of neutralizing these threats today.

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA Weekly Commentary..
13 September '18
Link: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=73358

Israeli policy towards Hezbollah today is driven by the "conceptzia" that their goal in the next major round is essentially a photo-op. Albeit a bloody one.

Hezbollah forces will cross into Israel and slaughter the Israelis who weren't evacuated in time, raise their flag and broadcast the event.

There's a similar "conceptzia" for Hamas. The only difference in the assessment is that Hamas is assumed to be both kidnapping and slaughtering Israelis.

Hundreds - or even thousands - of Israeli dead would be a tragedy. But it wouldn't threaten the future of the Jewish State.

After all, in both cases, whatever Hezbollah or Hamas does, it is expected that at the end of the round their losses in both forces and physical assets will be magnitudes greater than Israeli losses.

The "conceptzia" is a great source of comfort for policy makers.

It serves to justify postponing in perpetuity any substantive action against Hezbollah and Hamas.

There will always be a weapons system on order, a gizmo still under development, force reorganizations yet to be implemented and of course diplomatic considerations yet to be resolved.

But what if the "conceptzia" is wrong?

Lesson of Yom Kippur War: Violations Can't Be Fixed By Gizmos - by Dr. Aaron Lerner

...The lessons? #1. Serious security violations of agreements and understandings should be addressed by insisting on the enforcement of the agreement. #2. Gizmos are a poor substitute for compliance.

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA Weekly Commentary..
06 October '16..
Link: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=71554

Back on 30 September 2001, speaking at the main memorial service for those who died in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon noted that Israel was surprised in that war by Egypt because the Egyptians did not honor the 1970 cease-fire agreement and thus the lesson of the Yom Kippur War is that one must always pay attention when agreements are not honored.

It was worse than that.

Now we know the following:

#1 The Egyptians moved anti-aircraft missiles close to the Suez Canal the very moment that the cease-fire went into effect.

#2 The US had a spy plane that flew over the area that first day and photographed the violations. They were aware that first day that the Egyptians had violated the agreement. It should be noted that at the time the US asked Israel to provide evidence and for several days said it was waiting for evidence of violation.

#3 While BEFORE the agreement was signed, the US promised Israel that if the Egyptians moved up their missiles that the US would press the Egyptians to pull them back, when they finally had to face up to the violation, the US explained that they could not pressure Egypt. To be clear: discussions of the agreement held between Israel and the US focused on the Israeli concern that Egypt would move the missiles. This was anything but a minor footnote.

#4 The US ultimately compensated Israel with "black boxes" for Israeli aircraft that were meant to offset the damage to Israel's security caused by the Egyptian violation.

#5 The "black boxes" weren't enough. Those same anti-aircraft missiles ultimately provided invading Egyptian forces protection from the Israeli Air Force at the opening of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Conclusion: The failure of the United States to honor its commitment facilitated the devastating Yom Kippur War by making the invasion of the Sinai by Egypt possible!

The lessons?

Continued Cluelessness and the History of ‘Evenhanded’ Failure - by Evelyn Gordon

...Forty-three years later, it seems the lessons still haven’t been learned. The Palestinians and Hezbollah have replaced Cairo and Damascus as Israel’s main Arab enemies (Iran is non-Arab), but the world still prates about the “cycle of violence” and insists that “neither side” wants war, no matter how many times the Arabs say otherwise. And Western countries are still suffering from their own cluelessness about the conflict’s real nature.

Evelyn Gordon..
Analyses from Israel..
04 September '16..

Among those diplomats and journalists who don’t simply blame the Arab-Israeli conflict entirely on Israel, the preferred approach is “evenhandedness.” This approach, epitomized by the “cycle of violence” cliché, holds that both sides want peace and are equally to blame for its absence. Remarkably, this view has persisted despite decades of proving wrong in ways that hurt the very countries which espouse it – as demonstrated yet again by newly released documents from the Nixon Administration.

The documents, which Amir Oren reported this week in Haaretz, include redacted versions of the CIA’s daily presidential briefings on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The agency’s cluelessness is mind-blowing.

(Continue to Full Post)

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Tzvika Force - Realizing that he would need to face the remaining tanks alone

...Moments later, Cpt. Greengold discovered a company of Syrian tanks moving toward Nafah. With two tanks, he faced slim chances of success against the Syrian forces, but he was determined to protect the Israeli command center.

IDFblog.com..
21 October '13..

On October 6, 1973 – the first day of the Yom Kippur War – the Syrian military bombarded Israel’s northern border. At exactly 2:00 pm, its air force and artillery pounded IDF positions in the Golan Heights in coordination with an Egyptian strike in the Sinai Peninsula. Hours later, Syrian tanks and troops crossed the border and invaded Israeli territory. The IDF soldiers, suffering tremendous losses, scrambled to stop the Syrian onslaught.

Meanwhile, Captain Zvi “Zvika” Greengold, a 21-year-old tank commander, frantically left his home on a kibbutz near Haifa. Before the war, he had been granted two weeks’ leave before beginning a course for commanders. When he learned of the Syrian attack, he made his way northward to the Golan, where IDF forces were growing increasingly outnumbered.

In the late afternoon, Cpt. Greengold reached Nafah – an IDF command center in the Golan’s southern sector. Determined to join soldiers in the battlefield, he took command of two tanks and assembled scratch crews to run them. He made contact with troops in the southern sector and advanced toward them, identifying his tanks over radio as ‘the Zvika Force.’ With night falling, he set out along the Tapline Route – a road in the Golan Heights used by Syrian forces to enter Israeli territory.

Moments later, Cpt. Greengold discovered a company of Syrian tanks moving toward Nafah. With two tanks, he faced slim chances of success against the Syrian forces, but he was determined to protect the Israeli command center. In a heroic act, he began to coordinate an attack on the company. For hours, he persisted with extraordinary bravery, throwing himself at the enemy in the face of almost certain death.

The Yom Kippur War - 40 Years Ago And A Historical Debate That Rages To This Day

...But the official Syrian version of the war similarly obscures Egypt's role just as it ignores all but the war's earliest stage. Though Syrian units swiftly succeeded in recapturing much of the Golan, they were almost as quickly stopped by numerically inferior Israeli forces and compelled to fall back on Damascus. The Syrian capital was also threatened by IDF guns which were ultimately silenced not by Arab arms but by Soviet threats and American pressure.

Michael B. Oren..
The New Republic..
15 October '13..

Egyptians marked the fortieth anniversary of their army's putative triumph over Israel by bloodying one another in Tahrir Square. Syrians, too, commemorated the date with internecine violence. Only in Israel were chests, rather than heads, beaten in collective remembrance. The contrast illustrated the curious ways history can be marshaled, forgotten, and mourned. Memory indeed serves, but ever-changing masters.

The Yom Kippur War—Arabs prefer the Ramadan War, as though it was a battle between fasts—erupted on the afternoon of October 6, 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian forces surprised and overran Israeli positions. The following three weeks of fighting was brutal, the scale monumental. Rarely in the post–World War II period have the actions of both senior and junior commanders, the mass movement of armored and artillery formations, and the maneuvering of entire armies determined the course of a conflict and its outcome. Never again—thankfully—did the Cold War combine with nuclear brinkmanship and OPEC blackmail to produce a global, nearly apocalyptic crisis. And an historical debate that rages to this day. Indeed, the moment the war concluded, the fight over its legacy commenced.

In Egypt, for example, legions of schoolchildren daily ascend to Cairo's Citadel to tour the National Military Museum and its immense 1973 pavilion. Inside a nineteenth century-style panorama, through pieces of destroyed Israeli armor and aircraft and a curious iron engine labelled "Egypt's Secret Weapon" (actually, an hydraulic pump used to dissolve Israel's defensive sand dunes), Egyptian kids learn how their country's forces erected bridges across the Suez Canal and subdued enemy bunkers along the Bar Lev Line. With flags unfurling and bayonets fixed, they banished the occupiers, erased the stain of the 1967 debacle, and reclaimed sacred Sinai for Egypt.

The rendition, if purplish, is true—but only to that point. Nowhere in the exhibit is it noted that the offensive was eventually blunted and beaten back to an enclave surrounded by Israeli forces that had spanned the Canal into Egypt. No mention is made that some 80,000 Egyptian soldiers nearly surrendered for lack of water or that Cairo came within Israel's striking range. And, of course, there's no hint that those soldiers and that city were saved by a last-minute application of American might and statecraft. Emerging from this arcade of glory, any child could rightly ask why, if Egypt had won such an unmitigated victory, did it succumb to such a humiliating peace?

The Egyptian exhibition also fails to note that at that same hour, two o'clock in the afternoon of October 6, tens of thousands of Syrian troops, spearheaded by divisions of Soviet-made tanks, punched through Israeli defenses on the Golan Heights. The reason for the omission is obvious: Egypt's need to claim that it defeated Israel's juggernaut alone. But the official Syrian version of the war similarly obscures Egypt's role just as it ignores all but the war's earliest stage. Though Syrian units swiftly succeeded in recapturing much of the Golan, they were almost as quickly stopped by numerically inferior Israeli forces and compelled to fall back on Damascus. The Syrian capital was also threatened by IDF guns which were ultimately silenced not by Arab arms but by Soviet threats and American pressure.

Military Intelligence, the Yom Kippur War and the importance of self-doubt

...An organization that has won a number of successes, which alongside the pride in its accomplishments does not ask itself if those same successes could not have been achieved faster, more efficiently, or with greater accuracy -- inches closer to sliding down a slippery slope; an organization that is content and does not promote the constant presence of doubt and unease -- is paving its way toward failure.

Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi..
Military Intelligence Director..
Israel Hayom..
06 October '13..

On the eve of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, an intelligence overview was presented to the government, which included 37 articles describing the enemy's intensive preparations on all fronts. The pinnacle of the overview was "Article 40" -- which has since become synonymous with a severe intelligence failure. It stated that, "The probability that the Egyptians intend to go to war is low."

The problem was not with the information, rather with how it was interpreted and how the Israel Defense Forces prepared as a result. The gigantic discrepancy between the facts and their analysis can be explained in many ways, but the most striking and important of them all was the sense of exaggerated overconfidence and the lack of doubt about what the enemy was planning to do, and under what conditions. This overconfidence, among other factors, stemmed from a series of prior successes.

An organization that has won a number of successes, which alongside the pride in its accomplishments does not ask itself if those same successes could not have been achieved faster, more efficiently, or with greater accuracy -- inches closer to sliding down a slippery slope; an organization that is content and does not promote the constant presence of doubt and unease -- is paving its way toward failure.

Military Intelligence has known extraordinary accomplishments in recent years. The breadth of information is enormous, of a high quality, and the technology and operations that make it possible improves on a daily basis. The quality of analysis and assessment is good, and even if it is not devoid of mistakes the analysis is even-keeled and in-depth.

All these factors contribute to a sense of self-confidence but at the same time create dangers. There is nothing wrong with being self-confident, but with two caveats: that it does not become overconfidence; and that alongside this feeling of self-assurance, and in a balanced manner, doubt will be harvested and consistently maintained. Confidence is not the opposite of doubt. Confidence is required to act with free instead of cramped thought, and confidence is a precondition for flexibility and daring. However, true self-questioning is the profound understanding that the scope of knowledge is limited, that another interpretation is possible, that other operational, technological or intelligence options exist. Doubt creates an atmosphere of unease, which invites constant re-clarification and the desire to learn and improve. Experience, though, has taught us that doubt is a cumbersome beast, sleepy and lazy and not easily stirred from its slumber.

Ignoring the violations of agreements can have deadly consequences

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA..
05 October '13..

As Egypt prepares to celebrate the 40th anniversary of their successful October 6, 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal (that this move that started the Yom Kippur War concluded with the IDF 101 kilometers from Cairo and a starving surrounded Egyptian 3rd Army will not, of course be mentioned in the festivities) it is appropriate to take a moment to consider what made this Egyptian operation possible.

We Israelis focus on whether or not the war could have been avoided if Israel was more forthcoming in diplomatic activities before the war (often these discussions ignore Israeli willingness to negotiate and an Israeli initiative rebuffed by Egypt) but perhaps more important for future policymaking is why Egypt was able to carry out the operation in the first place.

Which brings us to probably the most profound and least discussed episodes in the Jewish State's short history: America's refusal to honor its commitment to enforce the 1970 Egypt-Israel ceasefire.

A refusal that was ultimately responsible for the Yom Kippur War.

The last time I can recall that a national leader saw fit to allude to this terrible series of events was then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 30 September 2001 address at the main memorial service for those who died in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Sharon noted that Israel was surprised in that war by Egypt because the Egyptians did not honor the 1970 cease-fire agreement and thus the lesson of the Yom Kippur War is that one must always pay attention when agreements are not honored.

For reference below is the 13 August 1970 statement by the Defense Minister Dayan on the immediate Egyptian violation of the 7 August cease-fire agreement.

Now we know the following:

Ignoring Mideast Reality Comes With a Price

...In that sense, the Concept was like every grand theory that ignores its own role in reshuffling assumptions and reshaping incentives. It was the same story with next grand Concept, when an Israeli government determined that peace was in its hands to give, and that what it chose to give was what the other side would be willing to accept. The signing of Oslo, under Bill Clinton’s big shadow on the White House lawn, is widely remembered as a moment of hope. In fact it was an act of hubris.

Bret Stephens..
Wall Street Journal..
17 September '13..
H/T Ruthfully Yours..

President Obama’s plan on Syria will fail for the same reason the Oslo Accord did.

Forty years ago Israel blundered disastrously on the eve of the Yom Kippur War because its military leaders had a concept about the circumstances in which it might be attacked, and the concept was wrong. Twenty years ago, Israel blundered disastrously by signing the Oslo Accord, because its political leaders had a concept about what it would take to get peace, and the concept was wrong.

Beware of policy makers bearing concepts.

That’s worth pondering as the Obama administration peddles another concept—that a deal with Russia will lead to disarmament by Syria—as a reason to call off military strikes. But agreements are not achievements, wishes are not facts, and theory is not reality.

In 1973, what Israeli military planners called Ha’Conceptzia—the Concept—was that Egypt would not attack without Syria, Syria would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt lacked the long-range bombers and ballistic missiles it would need to retake the Sinai Peninsula. It was a comforting syllogism that allowed Israel to dismiss accumulating evidence of an impending attack, including a personal warning from Jordan’s King Hussein, as nothing more than psychological warfare.

The flaw with the Concept was the Concept: Theory provides vision at the expense of clarity. It also obstructs thought. Had the Egyptian goal been to retake the entirety of the Sinai, Anwar Sadat would never have ordered an attack.

But Israel’s planners broadly failed to foresee that the Egyptians might be prepared to forego the hopeless military objective of retaking all of Sinai for the feasible one of retaking some of it; that Sadat could use limited military means to land a decisive psychological and political blow. The Israelis also neglected to take account of the possibility that the Egyptians could turn the Concept to their own advantage. The Concept made no allowance for the reality that humans are intelligent and nature is adaptive.

In that sense, the Concept was like every grand theory that ignores its own role in reshuffling assumptions and reshaping incentives. It was the same story with next grand Concept, when an Israeli government determined that peace was in its hands to give, and that what it chose to give was what the other side would be willing to accept.

The signing of Oslo, under Bill Clinton’s big shadow on the White House lawn, is widely remembered as a moment of hope. In fact it was an act of hubris.

Like to guess which newspaper might censor Israel's victory in Yom Kippur War?

It was a great Israeli military victory albeit one that came at a huge cost - the loss of more than 2,500 Israeli soldiers. Strategically, it signaled the futility of pan-Arab existential wars against the young Jewish state. But this is not how the New York Times tells the story on the 40th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War.

Leo Rennert..
American Thinker..
15 September '13..

The 1973 Yom Kippur War comprised two distinct phases.

In the first couple of days of the war, a joint Egyptian-Syrian assault broke through Israeli defenses and chalked up major territorial gains in the Golan in the north and in Sinai in the south. But from the third day on, Israel regrouped its forces and launched a highly successful counter-attack. Not only did the IDF regain all lost territory, but it also crossed the Suez Canal, encircled Egypt's Third Army and broke through to the road to Cairo. In the north, it not only recovered lost territory on the Golan but penetrated deep into Syria proper. By the time of the cease-fire, it was headed toward Damascus.

It was a great Israeli military victory albeit one that came at a huge cost - the loss of more than 2,500 Israeli soldiers. Strategically, it signaled the futility of pan-Arab existential wars against the young Jewish state.
But this is not how the New York Times tells the story on the 40th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. In an article by Jerusalem correspondent Isabel Kershner, it focuses entirely on the first phase when Israel's very existence seemed to hang in the balance, ignoring the IDF's remarkable recovery and eventual victory in the second part of the war. ("40 Years After War, Israel Weighs Remaining Risks" Sept.13)

It's as if the history of World War II consisted only of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor without any mention of who eventually emerged as the victor.

Syria, a clear and sobering debacle for Israel

...It all comes back with added force as Israel faces a new year (on the Jewish calendar) with Iran closer than ever to crossing the nuclear threshold. The question—now as then—is how much to work in synch with the U.S. and how much—and at what point—to take matters in one’s own hands.

P. David Hornik..
Frontpagemag.com..
13 September '13..

Saturday marks Yom Kippur, the holiest day on the Jewish calendar and, this year, the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the greatest trauma in Israeli history.

On the morning of October 6, 1973—the day on which Yom Kippur fell that year—Chief of Staff David Elazar met with Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to warn that the Egyptian and Syrian armies were about to attack Israel. Elazar urged a preemptive strike; six years earlier, in the Six-Day War, Israel’s preemptive strike had proved highly effective.

But Meir and Dayan, who were under heavy pressure from U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger not to preempt, overruled the chief of staff. The result was near-catastrophic as later that day the Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked first and took battlefield advantages while inflicting heavy casualties.

Israel was able to turn the tide and, with the help of a massive U.S. airlift, prevail. But the price was almost 2700 casualties and a country shocked, depressed, and shaken to its roots.

It all comes back with added force as Israel faces a new year (on the Jewish calendar) with Iran closer than ever to crossing the nuclear threshold. The question—now as then—is how much to work in synch with the U.S. and how much—and at what point—to take matters in one’s own hands.

Israel Hayom reports:

Ever since U.S. President Barack Obama surprised the world by seeking congressional approval for a military strike on Syria, concerns have grown among Israeli government officials in Jerusalem about a decline of America’s status in the Middle East and the implications for Iran’s nuclear program. No Israeli spokesperson has made an official statement on the issue….

On Wednesday, though, addressing a graduation ceremony for navy cadets, both Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon made statements that have been taken as implicitly critical of Obama’s confused, dithering approach to the Syrian chemical-weapons issue.

Netanyahu, invoking a “rule” from the ancient Jewish sage Hillel, said:

Amos Regev - The moment the MiGs came

I could identify them: A MiG-17 and MiG-19. And beneath their wings, silhouettes of bombs. And they were diving toward us • All I had was an Uzi with one clip, and with a shoelace for a strap • That’s it, I’m a goner, I thought to myself, hugging a rock.

Amos Regev..
Israel Hayom..
13 September '13..

A single moment of fear. That is what I remember. Fear like I had never felt until that moment, fear that I've never felt since that day, that single moment, 40 years ago.

And the firm decision that came out of it. I remember that as well. That I wasn't going to die like that. That there was no way I would be wiped out there, with nothing remaining of me. That no way was it going to be over. That I had lived until that moment, and then I would disappear as though I had never been.

The MiGs woke us up with the shriek of engines shortly before dawn broke. There were three of them, dark and faintly visible, the green-gray of Syrian military camouflage. When I raised my head from my sleeping bag, with the slightly sour odor inside and the moisture of dew outside, on the rocky ground, I saw them from the side, flying low. For a moment we could have thought they were ours, our own troops. Our air force at its finest.

And then they turned left, and I saw the shape and angle of the wings. MiGs, no question about it. As a teenager I had been interested in aircraft; I could identify them. A MiG-17 and a MiG-19. And beneath their wings, the small, threatening silhouettes of bombs. And they were diving toward us.

Then came the fear.

It was roughly a week after the war began. Our battalion of heavy motorized mortars (the Makmat 160 mm) was camped for the night along the border fence near the Quneitra-Damascus highway, which was known as the America Road. In front of us, slightly to the right, was the landscape that later became one of the best-known photographs of the war: The charred remains of the Syrian anti-aircraft convoy that had been destroyed from the air, its black artillery barrels still aimed upward over their burnt and twisted chassis.

(Video) Kahalani - The Story of a Warrior

Avigdor Kahalani with his crew

yossifoon..
May 8, 2011..

The "Story of a Warrior", a 14 minute video, recounts the battle to hold the Northern Golan against overwhelming Syrian forces, during the opening days of the Yom Kippur War. Through the eyes of Avigdor Kahalani, awarded the Medal of Valor for his decisive role as commander in this field of fire, we hear about the massive forces arrayed against his small group of tanks, tenaciously holding out against all odds, until reinforcements would arrive.

Yom Kippur War 40 years on – 3 Observations

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA Weekly Commentary..
12 September '13..




#1 Thankfully we ignored Abie Nathan's calls on Voice of Peace radio

It was 1973 and I was on Kibbutz Saad in the Negev.

Yom Kippur was just over and in a few minutes I was supposed to go over to the bomb shelter to help clear it out. The nightmarish war was well underway and many had already been called up and left Saad before the fast ended.

I flipped on my radio trying to get some news about the war and there was someone on in English urging the soldiers to put down their weapons. Not to fight. I thought it was an Arab station. But it wasn't. It was Abie Nathan on the Voice of Peace.

On August 2, 1995 I asked him about it:

IMRA: Did you ever get any flack from people who remember that you called for soldiers to put down their arms at the start of the Yom Kippur War?

Nathan: "We asked for people on both sides to put down their weapons and many people still remember it. I know many Egyptians who tell me that they heard the broadcast. I was broadcasting off of Port Said. We had just started broadcasting on the ship. It was on Yom Kippur and all the [Israeli - IMRA] radio stations were silent. Since I was off of Port Said I was really among the first to know that the war had started.

"No one thought there was anything wrong with calling for the soldiers not to fight. If the soldiers on both sides had only listened to me it would have left the war for the generals to fight."

But he wasn't calling in Arabic. It was in English.

And while some Egyptians may have heard him. his audience was overwhelmingly Israeli.

Thank God no Israeli soldier heeded his call.

Forty Years On - The "October Victory"

One final thought for those officers training to be company commanders: Could any of them have imagined how Israel would look in relation to the Arab states 40 years later, considering the battlefield conditions at the onset of the war when people were talking about the "defeat of Israel" -- certainly not the "October victory"?

Dr. Gabi Avital..
Israel Hayom..
08 August '13..

This year, yet again, analysts and experts will put on grim faces and tell us how terrible "that war" was. They will tell us how unnecessary that "damned" war was, and how awful the failure was. However, an all-encompassing view of the picture shows us that the results of the Yom Kippur War, from a military perspective, do not jive with the same dismal narrative.

If officers training to be company or battalion commanders today had been tasked with predicting the outcome of that war, given the same conditions in which it started and considering the size of both forces 40 years ago, none would have predicted it correctly. Not only did Arab armies have an advantage in sheer troop numbers and equipment in the field, not only did they enjoy the advantage of complete surprise, one must also factor in the sense of vengeance prevalent in their ranks -- the Egyptians in particular -- which had been building since the Sinai Campaign in 1956 less than two decades earlier. And of course, the fighting capabilities of the Syrian and Egyptian troops had improved significantly since the Six-Day War.

The turning of the tide on the battlefield, as it occurred less than one week after the war started, is not mentioned enough in unclassified military history. Not every country on the brink of destruction, as Israel was in the war's first days, could have bounced back with such a resounding victory on the battlefield. An army predicated on a doctrine in which its reserve force plays a central role but is drafted late, cannot do its job. An army based on principles of close air support, after the enemies' fighter jets have either been intercepted in the air or destroyed on the runway, and does not receive it because one quarter of the fighter jets in its fleet are lost, makes defense and deciding the war's outcome virtually impossible.

(Videos) The Battle Over the Soul -The Battle for Tel Saki

danalmagor..
25 July 11..

A film by Yuval Delshad
The Battle Over the Soul - Previews 3 of 3

At the battle of Tel Saki, one of the first of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a handful of Israeli paratroopers and armored soldiers stood their ground, fighting off thousands of enemy troops for three days with very little food, water and dwindling ammunition. This film, winner of Best Documentary at the Chicago Israeli Film Festival, recounts the courage, heroism and great sacrifice of ordinary young men as they unknowingly -- and against the odds -- play a pivotal role in a critical moment for the State of Israel. Their sheer determination and spirit not to abandon their friends and protect the country they all loved so much saved the State of Israel.

Less Than One Hour Away From Cairo and Monty Python's Black Knight (+Video)

LOTL..
07 October '12..









Sometimes you just scratch your head and wonder, other times ... even that will not adequately convey one's amazement. This excerpt from the Egypt Independent yesterday certainly meets the criteria:

“...We had a lot of superiority factors at the beginning. We succeeded in implementing the elements of surprise and initiative –– it was military planning at its highest levels,” recalls Bilal Barakat, a retired general who headed an artillery unit during the war. “After six years of intense and realistic training, the troops were able to perform the crossing almost on auto mode.”

Starting on 13 October, however, Barakat says the situation was reversed.

Beyond the canal crossing

What happened after that can’t be found in most records of the war in Egypt, whether in school curriculums, media or political speeches.

Historian Assem al-Dessouky argues that Sadat wanted to convince the Egyptian people that the war ended with the crossing of the canal to cover up his strategic mistakes later in the war.

With Sadat hailed as the mastermind of the October victory and toppled President Hosni Mubarak celebrated as the leader of the initial airstrike, both presidents had vested interests in propagating the war as an unquestionable victory, and prohibiting any questioning of the events during their rule.

Saad Eddin al-Shazly, military chief of staff at the time of the war, was dismissed in December 1973 after clashing with Sadat and Defense Minister Ahmed Ismail over several strategic decisions during the course of the war. He was marginalized by the regime.

Only after Mubarak’s ouster in 2011 were Shazly’s memoirs, “October War,” published in Egypt –– revealing a very different view.

“History will attest that ... Egyptian officers and soldiers have all exerted their best effort and had the greatest performance, but that Egypt’s ruler at the time, hungry for power and for the spotlight, has aborted their victory,” Shazly writes.

Following Egypt’s initial success, Shazly recounts that Sadat and Ismail insisted against field commanders’ advice on expanding the attack further into Sinai. Following the failure of the attack, Sadat committed what Shazly calls his second strategic mistake, bringing in reinforcements from reserve troops in the west, leaving the forces at the canal with little backup.

While Egyptian forces were suffering heavy losses in the east, Israeli troops were able to cross to the west of the canal through a gap between the Egyptian second and third armies.

Following the elation of the crossing, Barakat remembers the Israeli advancement into the west of the canal as “painful.”

Kilometer 101 on road to Cairo at the end of the "victorious" 1973 October War

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA..
04 October '12..

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: At the end of the "victorious" 1973 October War the Egyptian Third Army was "victoriously" trapped and "victoriously" starving to death while Israel negotiated with Egypt at Kilometer 101. The "victorious" Egyptian Army met with the "defeated?" Israeli Army at Kilometer 101 - but Kilometer 101 was not 101 kilometers from either Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. It was 101 kilometers from Cairo. By the same token, the "victorious" Syrian Army did not reach a ceasefire with the "defeated" IDF with the "victorious" Syrian army on the road to Haifa. Instead the "defeated" IDF was on the road to Damascus after pushing back the "victorious" Syrian army.]

President Anwar Sadat and his chief of staff Saad El-Shazli awarded Egypt's highest honour for their conduct during 1973 October War
Ahram Online , Thursday 4 Oct 2012
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/54754/Egypt/Politics-/Morsi-grants-Sadat--ElShazli-highest-medal-for-Oct.aspx

President Mohamed Morsi has granted former president Anwar Sadat and his Chief of Staff Saad El-Shazli the Nile Medal of Honour, Egypt's highest award, for their conduct during the 1973 War with Israel.

IMRA - How America Facilitated the Yom Kippur War

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA Weekly Commentary..
22 March '12..

Let’s take a moment to consider probably the most profound and least discussed episodes in the Jewish State’s short history: America’s refusal to honor its commitment to enforce the 1970 Egypt-Israel ceasefire.

A refusal that was ultimately responsible for the Yom Kippur War.

The last time I can recall that a national leader saw fit to allude to this terrible series of events was then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 30 September 2001 address at the main memorial service for those who died in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Sharon noted that Israel was surprised in that war by Egypt because the Egyptians did not honor the 1970 cease-fire agreement and thus the lesson of the Yom Kippur War is that one must always pay attention when agreements are not honored.

For reference below is the 13 August 1970 statement by the Defense Minister Dayan on the immediate Egyptian violation of the 7 August cease-fire agreement.

Now we know the following:

#1 The Egyptians moved anti-aircraft missiles close to the Suez Canal the very moment that the cease-fire went into effect.

#2 The US had a spy plane that flew over the area that first day and photographed the violations. They were aware that first day that the Egyptians had violated the agreement. It should be noted that at the time the US asked Israel to provide evidence and for several days said it was waiting for evidence of violation.

#3 While BEFORE the agreement was signed, the US promised Israel that if the Egyptians moved up their missiles that the US would press the Egyptians to pull them back, when they finally had to face up to the violation, the US explained that they could not pressure Egypt.

Simchoni - Lessons from the Yom Kippur War

Uri Simchoni
Israel Hayom
10 October '11

http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=632

Every October the ritual of after-the-fact analysis of the Yom Kippur War repeats itself. Why weren't we prepared, how could we not have known, why were our forecasts wrong, how did we get caught with our pants down? In fact, we can summarize decades of books, reports, analyses and what have you in a single sentence: You can never be prepared for what hasn't happened yet. It's not just us, and this principle doesn't just apply to security. In economics, politics and private life, it's hard to make predictions, especially where the future is concerned.

A lot has changed since October 1973. It's fashionable to speak of a revolution on the battlefield, but no revolution has occurred. Rather, there has been an evolution in technology and of the enemy, and as a result the nature of the contemporary battlefield has changed. The battlefield is now described as asymmetrical, a sophisticated response developed by radical Islam and terror organizations to Western technological superiority.

War creates opportunities for both sides to bring their decisive advantages to bear. That is the real asymmetry. In our last two wars, the Second Lebanon War and Cast Lead -- with the exception of aerial attacks, which were effective in the first two days when most of, if not all, of our objectives were obtained -- we fought the war on our opponent's terms. Whether we engaged in combat in the "nature preserves" (bunkers camouflaged by natural scenery) of Lebanon or cleared buildings in Bint Jbeil or Gaza, this was war on their terms, not ours. We don't and never will have any relative advantage in those places. To fight there and in that particular way is foolishness.

The next battlefield will most likely be on our homefront. The Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead both clearly exposed our weak points. We recently experienced a nationwide homefront exercise. We have heard forecasts of hundreds of tons of explosives on our city centers as well as other terrifying scenarios. This really doesn't have to happen. Defense systems like Iron Dome and other systems -- as good and effective as they may be, they are no doubt an outstanding technological achievement -- could defend several strategic targets, but certainly not population centers over the long term. The only way to really defend our homefront is by dramatically curtailing the duration of the fighting. The only way to shorten the duration of fighting to no more than 48 hours is to raise an international outcry and heavy pressure for an immediate cease-fire.

In order for this to happen we have to throw out concepts like proportionality. This is a term borrowed from other areas of life. War is not a game of ping pong. And it is a game they started, not us. It is totally unjust and immoral to allow harm to befall our own citizens just to avoid harm to citizens on the other side. That would constitute altruism, and altruists are the first to be annihilated in war.

‘What wonderful miracles happened there!’ ‘I’m a secular Jew, I don’t believe in miracles. ..'

Love of the Land
09 October '11





From "We had no choice but to win" :

“From the moment that I assumed command over the central Golan Heights (taking over from Brigade 188, which was nearly wiped out during those days of fighting) until the last day of the war, the Syrians had no idea, we just simply pushed them from one line to the other,” Danon said.

How do you explain this achievement?

[Ori]Or recalled a correspondence he shared with a soldier from the brigade. “A religious soldier from the brigade wrote to me after reading my book about the war (Ele ha’ahim sheli, “These are my brothers”) and he described to me his experiences without knowing what transpired in the brigade high command during those days,” Or said. “He summed it up in this sentence: ‘What wonderful miracles happened there!’ I wrote back to him: ‘I’m a secular Jew, I don’t believe in miracles. The people who won here are the soldiers and commanders that had faith in one another.’ It was during the war that this spirit began to coalesce within the brigade.”

Such a loss, such a misunderstanding, that his "secular" education left such an impression. Do miracles exclude "soldiers and commanders that had faith in one another", or the opposite?

Yoab saw that he faced enemies on two sides and chose the elite troops of Israel to deploy against Aram. he put the rest of his men under the command of his brother Avishai, and deployed them against the Ammonites. 

Yoav said, "If Aram proves stronger than I, you come to my aid, and if the Ammonites prove stronger than you, I will come to your aid. Be firm and resolute, for our people, and for the cities of our God, and God will do what is proper in his sight.

Yoav and the troops with him then proceeded to to fight against Aram, who fled before him. ...

II Samuel 10:9-10:13

Faithful commanders, faithful soldiers, together, fighting for their people, and for those cities and land, deeded them by God. Their defense, these soldiers responsibility, and the expectation. Three thousand years ago, thirty-eight years ago,  that continues today. A joint effort, including miracles.

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