A Yom Kippur War Repeat? The Self Serving Conceptzia - by Dr. Aaron Lerner

Suffice it to say that in the absence of the "conceptzia", the potential consequences associated with letting Hezbollah or Hamas pick the time and place of the next major round far outweigh the costs of neutralizing these threats today.

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA Weekly Commentary..
13 September '18
Link: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=73358

Israeli policy towards Hezbollah today is driven by the "conceptzia" that their goal in the next major round is essentially a photo-op. Albeit a bloody one.

Hezbollah forces will cross into Israel and slaughter the Israelis who weren't evacuated in time, raise their flag and broadcast the event.

There's a similar "conceptzia" for Hamas. The only difference in the assessment is that Hamas is assumed to be both kidnapping and slaughtering Israelis.

Hundreds - or even thousands - of Israeli dead would be a tragedy. But it wouldn't threaten the future of the Jewish State.

After all, in both cases, whatever Hezbollah or Hamas does, it is expected that at the end of the round their losses in both forces and physical assets will be magnitudes greater than Israeli losses.

The "conceptzia" is a great source of comfort for policy makers.

It serves to justify postponing in perpetuity any substantive action against Hezbollah and Hamas.

There will always be a weapons system on order, a gizmo still under development, force reorganizations yet to be implemented and of course diplomatic considerations yet to be resolved.

But what if the "conceptzia" is wrong?

Ignoring Mideast Reality Comes With a Price

...In that sense, the Concept was like every grand theory that ignores its own role in reshuffling assumptions and reshaping incentives. It was the same story with next grand Concept, when an Israeli government determined that peace was in its hands to give, and that what it chose to give was what the other side would be willing to accept. The signing of Oslo, under Bill Clinton’s big shadow on the White House lawn, is widely remembered as a moment of hope. In fact it was an act of hubris.

Bret Stephens..
Wall Street Journal..
17 September '13..
H/T Ruthfully Yours..

President Obama’s plan on Syria will fail for the same reason the Oslo Accord did.

Forty years ago Israel blundered disastrously on the eve of the Yom Kippur War because its military leaders had a concept about the circumstances in which it might be attacked, and the concept was wrong. Twenty years ago, Israel blundered disastrously by signing the Oslo Accord, because its political leaders had a concept about what it would take to get peace, and the concept was wrong.

Beware of policy makers bearing concepts.

That’s worth pondering as the Obama administration peddles another concept—that a deal with Russia will lead to disarmament by Syria—as a reason to call off military strikes. But agreements are not achievements, wishes are not facts, and theory is not reality.

In 1973, what Israeli military planners called Ha’Conceptzia—the Concept—was that Egypt would not attack without Syria, Syria would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt lacked the long-range bombers and ballistic missiles it would need to retake the Sinai Peninsula. It was a comforting syllogism that allowed Israel to dismiss accumulating evidence of an impending attack, including a personal warning from Jordan’s King Hussein, as nothing more than psychological warfare.

The flaw with the Concept was the Concept: Theory provides vision at the expense of clarity. It also obstructs thought. Had the Egyptian goal been to retake the entirety of the Sinai, Anwar Sadat would never have ordered an attack.

But Israel’s planners broadly failed to foresee that the Egyptians might be prepared to forego the hopeless military objective of retaking all of Sinai for the feasible one of retaking some of it; that Sadat could use limited military means to land a decisive psychological and political blow. The Israelis also neglected to take account of the possibility that the Egyptians could turn the Concept to their own advantage. The Concept made no allowance for the reality that humans are intelligent and nature is adaptive.

In that sense, the Concept was like every grand theory that ignores its own role in reshuffling assumptions and reshaping incentives. It was the same story with next grand Concept, when an Israeli government determined that peace was in its hands to give, and that what it chose to give was what the other side would be willing to accept.

The signing of Oslo, under Bill Clinton’s big shadow on the White House lawn, is widely remembered as a moment of hope. In fact it was an act of hubris.