More than a referendum is necessary before we cede land

...A referendum would give the public a chance to express its opinion on this specific issue. But here too a simple majority of those voting in the referendum cannot be deemed sufficient for approval. As is the case for approval of international treaties in the United States, a two-thirds majority should be required on an issue of such importance and which has long-term ramifications on the future of the country.

Moshe Arens..
Haaretz..
06 August '13..



What’s all this to-do about a governance law?

The ability of Israeli governments to govern has been proven time and again through thick and thin during the past 65 years. Israeli governments have handled wars, signed peace agreements, put an end to rampant inflation, absorbed millions of immigrants. Other democracies, including the United States, can only envy the ability of Israeli governments to get things done. Those who sought to imitate the U.S. presidential system need only look at the problems that Barack Obama faces in dealing with Congress. Putin’s Russian presidential system is something we really don’t want.

The matter of raising the threshold required for representation in the Knesset is quite another matter. Raising the threshold may or may not work to the benefit of the larger parties, which may or may not make forming and maintaining a government coalition easier. It is likely that it will prevent representation of some segments of opinion among the electorate. Considering the uncertainties, caution is called for and therefore one should proceed gradually. Raising the threshold from two to two-and-half percent seems reasonable; more than that may very well have unforeseen negative side effects.

But the real question is what kind of a majority is required for decisions of great importance or that have far-reaching consequences. Unlike other democracies, such as the United States, the Knesset has not adopted clearly defined rules establishing the majority required for the adoption of important laws or the ratification of international agreements. For example, in the United States the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress to propose an amendment to the Constitution, and a two-thirds majority in the Senate for the ratification of international treaties. A simple majority is not considered sufficient.

Preventing the US from railroading Israel into an agreement that would prove disastrous

Fresnozionism.org..
23 July '13..




Here is a good example of why Americans are misled about Mideast issues. In today’s local paper, I came across a story headlined “Israelis may vote on peace deal.” It began as follows:

JERUSALEM (AP) – Israel’s premier announced Monday he is fast-tracking legislation that would allow him to put any peace deal with the Palestinians to a national referendum – an apparent attempt to silence hard-liners in his party and coalition government. …

Netanyahu said Monday that a referendum is necessary to prevent a rift in Israeli society. Polls have suggested a majority of Israelis support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, but many groups are vehemently opposed, including hard-liners among Israel’s West Bank settlers. [my emphasis]

The impression given is that although a majority of Israelis favor an agreement with the Palestinian Authority (PA), the PLO-controlled Palestinian ‘government’, to withdraw from most of Judea and Samaria and perhaps eastern Jerusalem, and turn them over to become a Palestinian state, the peace process is being stymied by “hard-liners.”

The truth does not remotely resemble this. A majority of Israelis know that the PA has little support from the residents of the areas that it controls and none at all in Gaza, where 40% of the Palestinian Arabs live. They also know that the security consequences of a withdrawal from the territories would be unacceptable, and that while the PLO is sincere about wanting to get Israel out of the territories, it is not sincere about making peace.

The poll results mentioned in the story are based on questions like this: “Would you favor the establishment of a peaceful Palestinian state alongside Israel?” Of course a majority of Israelis would agree! Who doesn’t want peace? But at the same time, most realize that under today’s circumstances, an Israeli withdrawal would lead to anything but a peaceful state. They have the continuing example of Gaza, in case they forget what a sovereign Palestinian state is like.

Referendum? What advocates of a two-state solution need to worry about.

Rick Richman..
Commentary/Contentions..
05 May '13..

In his post supporting a referendum on any Palestinian peace agreement (“Democracy is Not an Obstacle to Peace”), Jonathan Tobin asked why peace processors would possibly fear a referendum:

“It is true that if a peace agreement were to be submitted to a vote, that would raise the possibility that Israel’s voters would reject it. But if a deal was truly in Israel’s best interests, what exactly are advocates of a two-state solution worried about?”

It’s a good question. Let me try to address it – because the answer is probably something other than a fear that the referendum might fail.

To appreciate the real answer, it is useful to review the reason a referendum was rejected in 2005, when Ariel Sharon proposed his disengagement plan, left the Likud after the party referendum rejected it, and thereafter refused to allow a national referendum. At the time, Haaretz editorialized against a referendum, citing the defeat of the EU constitution in a French referendum:

“Legislatures, governments and heads of the executive branch (presidents or prime ministers) are elected in order to bear the burden of making difficult decisions. Abandoning this responsibility and transferring it to the general public, which does not weigh the constraints and the available resources the way elected officials are supposed to do, transfers the vote from the domain of the intellect to that of emotion … Sunday’s vote in France constitutes fresh, additional proof of why Israel must not adopt this system.” [Emphasis added].

The Haaretz editorial approached self-parody — an elite paper with a small circulation was telling the public it was not smart enough to appreciate the issues, because the public was allegedly not equipped to “bear the burden of making difficult decisions”; it was short on intellect and long on emotion; it didn’t “weigh the constraints” or consider “the available resources”; and if you doubt that, just look at France — fresh proof of what happens when you let the public vote!

The consistent inconsistencies of the narrative of referendum opponents

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA Weekly Commentary..
02 May '13..

Let's set aside the small minority of Israelis who genuinely oppose requiring a referendum to approve any deal cut with the Palestinians because it doesn't jibe with their concept of how Israel's democratic system of governance should function.

The overwhelming majority of opponents of a national referendum assert that requiring the approval of a national referendum would kill the chances of ever completing a deal with the Palestinians.

Yet these very same people are constantly proclaiming that the majority of Israelis support the "two state solution" and that "everyone knows" what the elements of the "solution" are.

National referendum - the cement that binds

Dr. Aaron Lerner
IMRA Weekly Commentary
14 October '10

Many in the Israeli Left oppose legislation that would require holding a national referendum to approve future Palestinian-Israeli agreements on the grounds that such agreements couldn't pass if put to a national vote.

Read that again.

Yes.

That's right.

They don't think that the Israeli public, if provided the opportunity to vote directly on an agreement, would support it.

They then argue, along with a small minority from the Right, that Israel is a parliamentary democracy and that the citizens thus should only express their positions via their elected representatives rather via plebiscites.

Now if we were back in 1948 and the country had just been founded then one might accept this line of thinking.

But its 2010 now and the fact of the matter is that we have had a series of major agreements negotiated by prime ministers who accepted terms that they very clearly opposed when they ran for office. And the Knesset majorities that endorsed these agreements relied on parties that were elected on the basis of election platforms that contradicted these deals.

Was that democratic?

The argument that politicians who betray their mandates can be punished at the ballot box is hardly satisfactory given the permanent nature of the damage they have done.

There is a considerably more sophisticated - though more condescending - argument: That the Israeli public actually knows deep down in its collective heart that the Jewish State has to agree to "X", but that same public doesn't have the stomach to actively endorse "X". So citizens vote for candidates and parties that claim to oppose "X" knowing full well that their mandate will be defied.

But there is also a practical side to this issue that warrants consideration.

Without the promise of a national referendum there is a very large and significant segment of Israeli society in the dangerously frustrating position that they are not only aware that their will, as expressed via the elections, will be defied should an agreement be reached and that there is nothing, for all practical purposes, that they can do within the framework of the system to stop the betrayal.

The promise of a national referendum goes far beyond philosophical discussions of the meaning of democracy and its practical expression.

The promise of a national referendum would, in the event that an agreement is indeed reached, serve as the vital cement that keeps our social compact intact.

For with all the pain, it would be one thing for an agreement - no matter how distasteful it may be - to be signed after gaining approval in a national referendum, and quite another if the deal went through only because some politicians decided that they could get away with betraying their mandate.

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The Referendum Saga

Emmanuel Navon
For the Sake of Zion
30 July '10

Member of Knesset Yariv Levin has recently tried (unsuccessfully, so far) to pass a law that would compel the Government to organize a referendum before approving any transfer of territorial sovereignty in the framework of a peace agreement. Such a law is meant to give Israel’s citizens a veto power over a possible Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem and from the Golan Heights (both of which were annexed by Israel in 1967 and 1981 respectively).

While Levin’s proposal has many opponents in the Knesset and elsewhere, one surprising support came from Daniel Ben-Simon, a Labor MK and former journalist for Ha’aretz. A staunch opponent of referenda like most of his peers, Ben-Simon explained his unexpected volte-face by claiming that a majority of Israelis would approve a withdrawal from the Golan according to a recent poll. We should be thankful to Ben-Simon for being so candid. It’s not that he opposes referenda because he believes they infringe upon representative democracy. Rather, a referendum is acceptable only if voters give the “right” answer.

This patronizing hypocrisy is reminiscent of the European Commission’s attitude toward popular votes. For Brussels’ eurocrats, simple citizens are not smart enough to know what’s good for them and to understand that nationalism is evil. Referenda grant unsophisticated hordes a veto power over the right decisions of the philosopher-king. Indeed, the French, the Dutch and the Irish had to effrontery to say “no” to the European Constitution. True, there is a solution to the aggravations of democracy: you keep organizing referenda until people get it “right” (it worked with the Irish). But it’s cumbersome.

(Read full post)

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Special-majority referendum on territorial concessions advancing democracy & peace

Yoram Ettinger
The Ettinger Report
11 December 09

A special-majority referendum constitutes an acceptable procedure in Western democracies, when faced with exceptional – and sometimes irreversible – decisions, such as territorial concessions in the Golan Heights and in Judea and Samaria.

Contrary to opponents of a special-majority referendum - as a prerequisite for territorial concessions – such a procedure protects individual rights, national security and democracy, which are threatened by hasty decisions made under the influence of domestic and international pressure, impacted by exceptionally emotional developments and supported by a slim, tenuous majority, which could be transformed summarily into a minority. Special-majority referendums check an imperial executive branch of government, which wishes to dominate the legislature and to ignore public opinion.

For example, the "Evian Accords" which led to France's withdrawal from Algeria, were approved by two referendums in April and June 1962. President de Gaulle, who initiated the withdrawal, insisted that such an exceptional decision required a special majority, in order to prevent an internal rupture. De Gaulle insisted that a regular-majority could represent a minority of eligible voters, forge a sizeable disgruntled opposition and cause a collapse of democracy.

Charles de Gaulle understood the threat to democracy – under exceptional circumstances – if the special-majority referendum was dismissed. In 1946, the 53% majority which approved the constitution of the Fourth French Republic amounted to a mere 36% minority of eligible voters. Under such results, France deteriorated to the verge of a civil war in 1958.

(Continue article)

Related: The 3A Booby Trap Must Be removed From Referendum Law, Background: Referendum law would apply to "border adjustments" - but referendum avoidable via elections
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The 3A Booby Trap Must Be removed From Referendum Law

Weekly Commentary
Dr. Aaron Lerner
www.imra.org.il
10 December 09

Media coverage of the proposed law requiring a national referendum in the instance that less than 80 MKs support transferring sovereign Israeli territory has for the most part ignored the potentially critical Subparagraph 3A.

Here is a rough translation:

"Despite what is written in Paragraph 3(A), if the Knesset approved the Government decision as per Paragraph 2, and within 180 days from the day that the Knesset approved [AL: with less than 80 MKs] there are Knesset elections, a national referendum will not be held; The said Government decision will be considered as if it was approved by a national referendum on the thirtieth day after the formation of the Government that was formed after the election, or at an earlier date that the Government decided on it, unless it decided to cancel said Government decision as per Paragraph 2."

The explanatory commentary accompanying the proposed law takes the position that the Knesset elections would in effect be a national referendum since it would no doubt be a major issue of the election campaign.

But - and this could be a very big but - nothing would stop a ruling coalition that came to power by promising voters that "a vote for party X is a vote against deal Y" from defying its mandate and declining to cancel the previous Government's decision within the 30 days.

In fact, since the prime minister has absolute control over the agenda of cabinet meetings, he can simply refuse to bring up cancellation of the previous Government's decision to a vote for 30 days.

And this when, no doubt, the prime minister would be facing tremendous world pressure not to cancel the decision.

Far fetched?

Hardly. And the media would no doubt praise the prime minister for "acting
responsibly".

OK.

So let's assume for a moment that a newly elected Government brought to power because it opposed the agreement the previous Government reached would actually honor and respect its mandate and vote to cancel the deal.

What does the country gain by requiring a cabinet vote?

Let's think this through:

By definition we would have a new prime minister heading a ruling coalition that defeated the previous coalition that supported the deal.

So which scenario would better serve Israel's interests?

That the new prime minister can tell the world that his "hands are tied" by the outcome of the referendum and the deal is off?

Or

That the new prime minister has to raise his own hand to cancel an agreement that, no doubt, enjoyed the backing of the United States and other important countries?

That's a no brainer.

Here's an idea.

Instead of dropping the referendum in the instance that there are elections, why not have citizens cast their ballots in the referendum at the same as they vote in the Knesset elections?

Related: Special-majority referendum on territorial concessions advancing democracy & peace, Referendum law would apply to "border adjustments" - but referendum avoidable via elections
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Background: Referendum law would apply to "border adjustments" - but referendum avoidable via elections

Dr. Aaron Lerner
IMRA
09 December 09

While most discussions of the proposed referendum law relate to its being applied to the case of a deal involving the Golan or Jerusalem, the law also would apply to border adjustments - no matter how small - as long as they entail transferring sovereign Israeli territory.

While the proposed law requires a national referendum in the instance that less than 80 MKs support transferring sovereign Israeli territory, the referendum would not be required if elections are held.

"Despite what is written in Paragraph 3(A), the Knesset approved the Government decision as per Paragraph 2, and within 180 days from the day that the Knesset approved [AL: with less than 80 MKs] there are Knesset elections, a national referendum will not be held; The said Government decision will be considered as if it was approved by a national referendum on the thirtieth day after the formation of the Government that was formed after the election, or at an earlier date that the Government decided on it, unless it decided to cancel said Government decision as per Paragraph 2."

The explanatory commentary accompanying the proposed law takes the position that the Knesset elections would in effect be a national referendum since it would no doubt be a major issue of the election campaign.

But - and this could be a very big but - nothing would stop a ruling coalition that came to power by promising voters that "a vote for party X is a vote against deal Y" from defying its mandate and declining to cancel the previous Government's decision within the 30 days.

In fact, since the prime minister has absolute control over the agenda of cabinet meetings, he can simply refuse to bring up cancellation of the previous Government's decision to a vote for 30 days.

And this when, no doubt, the prime minister would be facing tremendous world pressure not to cancel the decision.

Far fetched?

Hardly. And the media would no doubt praise the prime minister for acting responsibly".

Related: Special-majority referendum on territorial concessions advancing democracy & peace
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Dr. Aaron Lerner follow up to his response to Peace Now "Excuse me, your bias is showing..."

Dr. Aaron Lerner
IMRA
11 November 09

(The original posting was "Dr. Aaron Lerner responds to Peace Now "Excuse me, your bias is showing...". Click here to read.)

So far from the responses it is clear that withdrawal proponents are unable to address the underlying observation that there is a defect in the democratic system if politicians can take a move that permanently changes the situation in a profound way that is in gross contradiction of a specific and explicit campaign promise and that a device is required to address this problem.

[To argue that the fact that Israel retook land in a war hardly serves as comforting evidence that withdrawals are reversible should the Israeli public object to a withdrawal that Israeli politicians agreed to in defiance of their mandate.

As for the impact of settlement activity - it didn't stop PM Olmert from negotiating and presenting a radically generous offer to Mahmoud Abbas - Abbas was the problem. And by the same token it can be argued that settlement activity puts pressure on the Palestinians to talk because time is not necessarily on their side. But, again, the underlying observation is that settlement construction is not subject to the same reversibility issue as withdrawals in diplomatic agreements.]

The question is not the merits of withdrawal or the fruits of withdrawal.

The question is if the citizens of Israel should have the right to express their view and have it honored.

This tremendous fear of a national referendum on the part of withdrawal proponents only serves to indicate that they lack confidence in their ability to convince the public to support their program.

That's their problem.

I would note, by the way, that the Palestinians say that they will present any deal for approval in a national referendum.

As for the charge that I hide my agenda behind an appeal to democratic principles. I resent the attempt to avoid my point by somehow stripping me of my right to argue for my democratic rights.

I live in Israel for many reasons (I live in Raanana which is a fantastic place so you won't find me claiming it is a sacrifice - though it certainly is the case that our family has sacrificed many years in army service) and one of them is to actively participate in the history of the country. And one the key ways that I participate in the history of the country is by voting in elections. Sometimes I "win" in the elections and sometimes I "lose". But that's the way democracy works. Adding a national referendum is a device to insure I have a say when politicians decide to defy their mandate.

And if I lose?

I won't pack my bags.

We don't rent. We own.

Back when PM Sharon, certain he would win a Likud referendum on the retreat from Gaza (he argued that there wasn't time for a national referendum), approved the vote, I was - as many others - on record that we would accept the outcome, regardless of which way it fell.

I participated in what was an exciting exercise in democracy, with people going door-to-door arguing their case.

And to PM Sharon's shock, he lost the referendum.

And he then ignored the outcome and continued on his way.

A low point for Israeli democracy.

Again. I understand and appreciate that it is hardly a foregone conclusion that my position will win the day at the ballot box.

And I accept that.

But as a voting Israeli citizen I want my fair chance to participate.

[PS: It turns out that Noam Shelef sent me a note via Twitter to alert me to his comment. While I send material out via Twitter I don't check it myself, hence the incorrect comment that he did not alert me to his comment.]
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Dr. Aaron Lerner responds to Peace Now "Excuse me, your bias is showing..."

Dr. Aaron Lerner
IMRA
07 November 09

Noam Shelef issued an offer to me on the Peace Now website that I endorse requiring a national referendum to approve settlement construction as well as agreements that involve territorial concessions.

[He offered it on the website (click here) - but didn't actually send me a message with the offer - but thanks to Google Alert I received the item in my e-mail mailbox. But that's not the point of this note.]

There is a fundamental difference between settlement construction and territorial concessions Israel makes in diplomatic agreements and implements.

Reversibility.

As was well illustrated in the retreat from Gaza and destruction of settlements in northern Samaria under the Sharon Administration, settlements can be unilaterally removed by Israel without requiring either the cooperation or approval of third parties..

In sharp contrast, Israel cannot unilaterally retake territory it ceded to another country without profound diplomatic and other consequences.

So a politician who betrayed his constituents by promising them to, for example, keep the Golan, in order to get elected and then cut a deal to hand it over to Syria might very well get the boot come election time - but the Syrian would still have the Golan.

This fundamental difference was recognized in the Oslo agreements. Changing the status of territory was banned - not settlement construction.

Article XXXI Paragraph 7 of the Interim Agreement: "Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations."The meaning of "status" means "legal status". A violation of the agreement would take place if Israel annexed part of the West Bank or Gaza Strip orthe PA declared an independent state in the area before the negotiations were concluded. Israeli settlement activity is no more a violation of theAgreement than Palestinian construction.

This is not just an Israeli interpretation.

"the Oslo agreement was not clear in the need to stop the settlement machine"

That's straight from "The political agenda of the national liberation movement Palestinian "Fatah" Submitted to the Sixth Conference of the Movement " June 28, 2009 Draft. www.fatehconf.ps/pdfs/fatehpolitical.pdf

Related: Powerful Need for National Referendums
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Weekly Commentary: Yossi Beilin unintentionally brings powerful argument for national referendums

Dr. Aaron Lerner
IMRA
05 November 09

"If you are in power with the responsibility for the future of the People on your shoulders and if you are convinced that it is the correct path don't hesitate. Don't knowingly make the wrong decision only because you found yourself saying something in the heat of the election campaign. In any case in the next elections you will face the judgment of the public. There will be those who won't vote for you because you were ostensibly disloyal, and there will be those who will vote for you because of your wisdom and courage."
Yossi Beilin - column in Yisrael Hayom - 2 November 2009

The purpose of the democratic process is to enable the electorate to impact policy.

Yossi Beilin's view of the democratic process is that politicians should have no qualms getting elected on one platform and implementing another - so long as they are willing to risk getting the boot.

Beilin unintentionally presents a powerful argument for the need for national referendums to approve agreements involving territorial concessions.

That's the only way to insure that the public's will is ultimately honored.
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