Showing posts with label disengagement from Gaza. Show all posts
Showing posts with label disengagement from Gaza. Show all posts

Monday, August 3, 2020

(Please Share) Sharon, Olmert and Israel's Non-Disengagement II - by Nadav Shragai

The late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon denied that Israel was planning a second disengagement from Judea and Samaria, but it turns out that he and former Justice Minister Tzipi Livni appointed a secret team that was charged to look into the feasibility of the idea.

Nadav Shragai..
Israel Hayom..
31 July '20..
Link: https://www.israelhayom.com/2020/07/31/israels-non-disengagement/

Fifteen years ago today, the day after Tisha B'Av of that year, 1,751 families (about 9,000 people) were evicted from their homes in Gush Katif and northern Samaria, along with thousands of supporters who had come to help them. A total of 26 communities in Gush Katif, the northern part of the Gaza Strip, and northern Samaria were turned into ruins in what was defined as either "disengagement" or an "expulsion." The unprecedented event, which then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon initiated as part of the peace process, is still etched on the hearts of many on the Right and the Left as a serious trauma and a major mistake in terms of defense and security.

As the years passed, a few reports were published about the second stage of the disengagement that Sharon had planned or considered for Judea and Samaria. In his final months as prime minister, prior to suffering a stroke that left him comatose, Sharon denied these reports.

Now new details are emerging that put these denials in a different light, especially when it comes to tactics. "Disengagement II," the "Realignment Plan" that former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert attempted to implement during his time in office, was cooked up under Sharon. Sometimes, things were done with his explicit approval, and sometimes without any response, but Sharon knew everything. He certainly didn't forbid work on the matter.

In December 2005, three months after the disengagement plan was complete, Sharon and then-Justice Minister Tzipi Livni appointed a committee under the leadership of the director general of the Justice Ministry, Aharon Abramovich. It was a sort of continuation: Abramovich and his people had previously led the work of the teams that put together the legal and financial framework for the disengagement.

At that time, the team was asked to present the security and defense, economic, legal, and diplomatic framework for another withdrawal, this one from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), to be based on the lessons of the disengagement from Gaza and northern Samaria. The committee was not given a mandate to lay down the borders of the retreat or decide which settlements would be evacuated, but was asked to map out the Israeli interests of another unilateral move for the area of the West Bank, if it turned out that there was no Palestinian partner for peace negotiations.

Thus, for example, Abramovich and his friends looked as the financial costs of evacuating 15,000 settler families (about 100,000 people) from far-flung communities. This would have been 10 times as many setters as the number evicted from Gush Katif.

Attorney Dov Weissglas, who at the time served as Sharon's chief of staff, tells Israel Hayom that these were "initial thoughts."

He clarifies: "We thought we needed to reorganize the Israeli presence in Jude and Samaria. No doubt, if Sharon hadn't been taken ill, the reality there would be completely different. It was a film that was cut off because of a power outage."

Weissglas confirms a report by the late journalist David Landau after the disengagement. In his book Arik: The Life of Ariel Sharon, Landau wrote: "In October 2005, we all – [Weissglas], Sharon, his sons, Reuven Adler, my wife and I, went to the Galilee for a weekend. We talked for hours about the future … The disengagement from the Gaza area was a move in and of itself, but it was intended to be combined with an additional move that would come later that was based both on the Road Map [a plan devised by the Middle East Quartet and adopted by the administration of George W. Bush] and the desire to avoid an impasse. The thinking was to continue on to a similar action in the West Bank. We hoped that the security barrier would help create that reality, that the Jews living on the other side of the fence would start coming back to Israeli territory … that we would gradually withdraw our forces from more and more cities, more and more areas – without the whistles and bells of negotiations about a permanent peace deal, which would certainly get stuck on the issue of Jerusalem. That was exactly Sharon's thinking … that was where the decision to set up the team under Abramovich was made."

The committee's concern

Abramovich's team included Director General of the Finance Ministery Yossi Bachar, the Deputy Attorney General for International Law Shavit Matias, Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, and attorney Daniel Reisner. Abramovich worked in secret, far from the spotlight, while Sharon was flatly denying remarks by Olmert, who was acting prime minister, and his close associate Eyal Arad that a second disengagement was expected or being considered.

The committee's existence came to light only after Sharon fell into a coma and Olmert took his place. Olmert made the Realignment Plan one of his main issues and talked about it openly. Unlike Sharon, he didn't try to hide it at all. Abramovich, who moved from director general of the Justice Ministry to director general of the Foreign Ministry – along with Livni, who also switched ministries – continued his work.

In August 2006, after Sharon had been comatose for eight months, the committee submitted Olmert and Livni with a thick report that contained hundreds of pages and revealed a number of problems entailed in executing the move. The committee members started out by listing major difference between Gaza and Judea and Samaria.

According to the committee, the West Bank is "tactical terrain," whereas the Gaza Strip is topographically lower than Israel. The West Bank also has a number of water sources that are important to residents of Israel, which Gaza does not. The Gaza Strip is entirely closed off and easier to control from outside in terms of security. In contrast, the committee said, Israel would have difficulty finding a solution to the threat of rocket fire from hilly areas in Judea and Samaria, and there was also concern that Hamas would gain control of the large population centers there, making continued IDF presence in key parts of Judea and Samaria the most reasonable way of preventing rocket attacks and a Hamas takeover.

The committee members also assessed that in the case of a necessary military presence of that kind, Israel would not be able to receive international recognition of an "end to the occupation." They also expressed concern that a unilateral withdrawal would endanger the stability of Jordan, and observed that unlike Gaza, from whence Israel retreated to the Green Line, it wanted to hold onto the West Bank settlement blocs, part of the Jordan Valley, and east Jerusalem until a permanent peace agreement was signed.

'Arik asked, what will Condoleezza Rice say?'

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

The Critical Debate Over What Should Be Learned from the Gaza Disengagement - by Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen

The debate over the interpretation of the clear and present danger emanating from Gaza in the wake of the 2005 unilateral disengagement holds the key to saving Israel from the dangers attending the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen..
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,257..
16 August '19..
Link: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/gaza-disengagement-lessons/

In the summer of 2005, as Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza drew near, the self-styled “Council for Peace and Security” issued a declaration – signed by hundreds of former senior officers and security officials – that promised that “the disengagement will improve Israel’s security situation.” Fourteen years later, many of these “security experts” – including newly retired general turned leftwing politician Yair Golan – continue to maintain that the disengagement from the Gaza Strip altered Israel’s security situation for the better. They base their claim mainly on comparisons between the number of wounded and killed in the period preceding the disengagement and in the years since.

They do not take into account, however, the massive disruption of the normal life of the country – from the ongoing suffering caused to many Israelis, to the huge investments poured into protecting communities and building another barrier with a price tag far exceeding 4 billion shekels, to the heavy cost of the three large-scale operations (2008-9, 2012, 2014) and the numerous rounds of fighting. The costs of Operation Protective Edge (2014) alone – including total military and civilian outlays and calculations for lost productivity – came out to over 10 billion shekels. The “experts” also ignore the balance of terror, and consequent loss of Israeli freedom of action, that Hamas has established with its rockets and that enables it to upset routines on the Israeli home front at will.

Above all, by making the number of casualties the main criterion by which to assess the security situation, as US generals did in Vietnam to cover up their abysmal failures, the “experts” ignore the fact that a national-security equation does not by any means depend primarily on the number of wounded and killed. If that were indeed the key criterion, most struggles for national liberation would not have happened.

It is no coincidence that those claiming that the unilateral disengagement improved Israel’s security situation are also those who favor further withdrawals in the West Bank. The inevitable linkage between what has transpired in Gaza since the IDF’s departure and the uprooting of the communities in the summer of 2005, and what is likely to occur if a similar step is carried out in the West Bank, calls for comprehensive and critical reassessment of all that has happened in Gaza over the past 14 years.

Saturday, February 20, 2016

The Arab Attitude toward Israel’s 2005 Unilateral Disengagement - by Brig.-Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser

Brig.-Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser served as the head of the Research Division for Military Intelligence of the Israel Defense Forces in 2005 at the time of the disengagement from Gaza and parts of Northern Samaria. Because of his special vantage point he is able to bring a new insight to the subject.Intelligence professionals were not consulted in the decision-making process. While the Prime Minister and his confidants hoped that this initiative would result in a political advantage for Israel and strengthen its security, it is clear that they did not take possible Arab and Palestinian reactions into account, particularly those of Hamas. In this article Brig.-Gen. Kuperwasser presents the issue of disengagement from a fresh perspective and describes its unintended consequences, which could have been foreseen.

Brig.-Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser..
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs..
18 February '16..






A First-Hand Account from an Israeli Insider

The Arab Perspective

Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip had undeniable consequences for the Arab world, including the Palestinians, but those consequences were not taken into account in the process leading to the dramatic decision. In this essay, I shall provide my own reflections as former head of the Research Division of Military Intelligence at that time when the fateful decision of the disengagement was made. It is noteworthy that intelligence professionals were not consulted in the process at all and their assessment was not requested before the decision was taken. Instead, a small group of decision-makers carried out this plan. Their attitude and thinking suffered from a number of weaknesses characteristic of Western political and strategic thought in the region.

I also will show that the Arabs had mixed responses to the disengagement. Each player, including the different groups in the Palestinian political system, emphasized what was important to its own outlook and interests.

On the one hand, the disengagement was perceived as an achievement of the Palestinian struggle and as a positive precursor to an eventual Israeli withdrawal from parts of the disputed territories in the Land of Israel/Palestine. The precedent of the withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 opened the way for similar moves in the future. It is important to note that the decision to pursue disengagement was taken at a time when Palestinian terrorist activities, including the area of the Gaza Strip, reached their highest levels. Thus, from the Arab point of view, it exposed the failure of Israeli society to cope effectively with that challenge. This perspective is further supported by the fact that the actual disengagement was implemented at a time, toward the undeclared end of the Second Intifada, when terrorist activities slowly began to subside. In addition, the policy of terrorism failed to produce long-term gains for the Palestinians who regarded their campaign as ultimately ineffective because it came at a heavy price and yielded no tangible results. Nonetheless, the Palestinian leadership appropriated the disengagement and used it as a sign of success in their otherwise futile struggle to motivate other radical actors in the region. The disengagement may have been one of the factors that encouraged Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hizbullah, to intensify his efforts to carry out an additional kidnapping. This eventually materialized in July 2006 when two soldiers were kidnapped – an act that led to the Second Lebanon War. Later Nasrallah admitted that it was a mistake.

Whereas the radical actors of the Palestinian leadership celebrated the disengagement as a victory, its more pragmatic elements regarded it as problematic. They feared that it would further fuel terrorism and hence harm internal stability within the Palestinian political leadership. Given that the leadership was going through a period of internal strife and instability, they felt that the disengagement might further complicate relations with their political opponents and that they would be forced to cooperate with the extremist factions.

In the neighboring region, the disengagement created far-reaching consequences particularly for Egypt, which – in light of Israel’s decision to evacuate also the border area, the Philadelphi Route – was forced to come to terms with Fatah and Hamas and allow increased smuggling from Sinai to Gaza, particularly by Hamas. Moreover, at the time, Egypt suffered domestically from increasing Islamic terror, especially in Sinai. (Before the disengagement a mass-casualty attack took place in Sharm el-Sheikh on 23 July 2005, and Egypt convened an Arab summit to discuss the disengagement and the terror attacks.)1

The Palestinian Sphere of Influence

Concurrently, the Palestinians claimed the disengagement as an achievement and felt vindicated by the dismantlement of the settlements and the Israel Defense Forces’ departure from the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians began to think that the pressure on Israel should continue, which could then bring them closer to their next objective – a unilateral withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, and from Jerusalem. To ensure that Israel would not retract the decision at the last moment, the Palestinian factions resolved to keep things quiet during the disengagement itself, which they did.

Sunday, August 17, 2014

Gush Katif, heroism and forgiveness

...They swallowed their pain, even when some living in the Gaza periphery for months called them "occupiers" and demanded that they "come home." The kibbutzniks were convinced that if their neighbors in the old Gaza periphery would just pack up their belongings, there would be peace on Israel, and the Palestinians would turn their swords into plowshares.

Nadav Shragai..
Israel Hayom..
17 August '14..

More than 6,000 mortars fell on Gush Katif communities in its last years. Mortars are known for their incoming whistle and the explosion just after they hit. There is no siren or Color Red alert for the mortars, which caused destruction and anxiety but could not force the residents out of their homes. Unlike some Tel Avivians during the Gulf War, unlike some of the residents of Kiryat Shmona when Katyusha rockets were fired at them, and unlike some of the Gaza periphery residents only recently, the people of Gush Katif exemplified unrecognizable Jewish steadfastness. Every day of green grass, laundry drying in the breeze, planting in greenhouses and studying Torah -- even when the sword of their brothers who would forcibly evacuate them rested on their necks -- was for them an almost holy commandment. We are the country's bulletproof vest, they said, not concealing their pride.

The forgotten history of Gush Katif is relevant today. Not as criticism of those who chose to leave their Gaza border homes until things were over (more than a few chose to stay, but the media focused on those who left) -- the people of Kfar Aza, Nahal Oz or Ein Hashlosha have every right to evacuate their children and themselves to a safe place and demand that the state provide them with security. No one who isn't in their place can judge them.

In contrast, the heroic story of Gush Katif is a story that should be retold today, because at the time the people there were accused by some sectors of the Israeli public of "sacrificing their children" and using them for political purposes. The "Gushniks" who were carrying on the great Zionist tradition of devotion and keeping hold of the Land in the face of disease, plague, terrorist attacks and war did not leave; they quietly swallowed the insults. They were silent when it became clear that the army was responding to the increasing shelling on Sderot, while ignoring the shelling on them. They even kept quiet when their neighbors in Sderot saw their city included in the list of border conflict communities (a status that grants significant material benefits), while they, who had been attacked much more for years, were ignored.

They swallowed their pain, even when some living in the Gaza periphery for months called them "occupiers" and demanded that they "come home." The kibbutzniks were convinced that if their neighbors in the old Gaza periphery would just pack up their belongings, there would be peace on Israel, and the Palestinians would turn their swords into plowshares. Now, after many have asked the residents of Gush Katif for forgiveness, it's time for the residents of the Gaza periphery communities to do the same.

Time to revisit the 'Iron Wall'

...“For a left-winger, you sound very much like a right-winger, wouldn’t you say?” Morris was asked by Ari Shavit in the above mentioned Haaretz interview. “I identify with Albert Camus” said Morris. “He was considered a left-winger and a person of high morals, but when he referred to the Algerian problem he placed his mother ahead of morality. Preserving my people is more important than universal moral concepts.”

Dr. Emmanuel Navon..
i24 News..
13 August '14..

When Ariel Sharon announced his “disengagement plan” at the 2003 Herzliya Conference, he claimed that “the purpose of the disengagement plan is to diminish terrorism and to provide security to Israel’s citizens,” and that his plan “would improve our quality of life and boost our economy.” Since the plan’s implementation in August 2005, over 12,000 rockets have been fired into Israel and more than 5 million Israelis are living under threat of rocket attacks. Around the Gaza Strip, Israelis live in constant fear of a missile landing on their house and of terrorists popping out of their living room from an underground tunnel.

Israel has had to fight three wars to tackle the effects of the 2005 retreat (Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, and the ongoing Operation Protective Edge). As for the economy, Hamas has proved its ability to shut down Ben-Gurion airport and to bring Israel’s tourist industry to its knees. Operation Protective Edge is estimated to have cost $3.6 billion (direct military expenses and indirect damages to the Israeli economy). When Sharon submitted the disengagement plan to his Likud constituents in a referendum (whose results he ignored), he claimed that “after disengagement, the international community will no longer be able to assert that the Gaza Strip is occupied.” This also proved to be delusional.

Israel left Gaza, but Gaza never left Israel. In fact, Gaza is more lethal from without than from within.

Sharon came up with his disengagement plan to surprise his enemies from their rear, just as he did three decades earlier when he crossed the Suez Canal. In 2003, Sharon was under criminal investigation and his forced resignation had become a foregone conclusion. In addition, the Geneva Initiative put him on the defensive. His cynical tactical move proved masterful: the state prosecutor suddenly and mysteriously dropped all charges against him, and Israel’s left-leaning media re-branded its bête noire to Israel’s greatest statesman since Ben-Gurion.

But Sharon’s disengagement plan also expressed the zeitgeist of the Herzliya Conference, reflecting an emerging consensus among Israelis. After Arafat had rejected the Camp David proposal in July 2000 and the Clinton parameters in December 2000, even Israel’s most starry-eyed peaceniks were altogether horrified and disillusioned. In October 2000, Shlomo Avineri, an enthusiastic supporter of the Oslo process, published an open letter to Edward Said in The Jerusalem Post saying: “You were right, Edward: compromise doesn’t work … Thank you again for your honesty.” Benny Morris, who started his academic career as a “new historian” on the far left of Israel’s political spectrum said in an interview with Haaretz in 2004: “When the Palestinians rejected the proposal of [prime minister Ehud] Barak in July 2000 and the Clinton proposal in December 2000, I understood that they are unwilling to accept the two-state solution. They want it all. Lod and Acre and Jaffa.”

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

Oh My! Hamas Tunnels Under the 'Two-State Solution'

...In 2005, Israel pulled its forces out of Gaza, attempting to defy the laws of military physics, and the experiment has literally blown up in the country's face. But any chance of pulling off a sequel in Judea and Samaria has now thankfully gone up in a plume of smoke, just like many of the rockets that Hamas has been firing at us without pause.

Michael Freund..
Pundicity/JPost..
12 August '14..

Whatever dubious strategic goal might have been behind Hamas' ill-advised decision to goad Israel into war last month, there is no doubt that the jihadists have endured a severe, and well-deserved, thumping. With a greatly diminished terror infrastructure, a shrunken inventory of rockets and tunnels, hundreds of dead terrorists and its leadership in hiding, Hamas has little to show for the violence that it provoked.

Nonetheless, there is one significant achievement, albeit unintended, that the gangsters of Gaza have to show for themselves: Hamas has put the final nail in the coffin of the so-called two-state solution. Ironically, the subterranean shafts they burrowed underground, and the multiple explosive projectiles they hurled at Israel, have all but toppled any chance that a Palestinian state will ever arise in Judea and Samaria.

For through its actions, Hamas has underlined for the Israeli public in stark terms the dangers of abandoning territory to Palestinian control, wiping away many of the illusions that have been promoted by the Left since the 1993 Oslo accords.

Friday, August 8, 2014

Nine years on, revisiting the disengagement from reality

The same pundits who claimed that evacuating Gush Katif would improve Israel's security and dismissed the Palestinians' "flying objects" as inconsequential, are now offering the government advice on dealing with the threat they did not see coming.

Nadav Shragai..
Israel Hayom..
08 August '14..

Four years prior to the 2005 evacuation of Gush Katif, acclaimed author Aharon Meged penned a jarring essay in which he warned of a "rose-colored blindness." It is an affliction that "causes people to only see pink by choice," he said. Meged was convinced that the peace camp was beset by such a condition.

In recent weeks, as what was once considered a causal link between the disengagement on the one hand, and the enhanced capabilities of the terrorists in Gaza Strip on the other hand, became poignantly clear, we returned to the press archives and worn-out news clippings of that era. We refer back to the news sites and the newspapers that documented the fierce debate that raged in Israel a decade ago between the Right and the Left over the disengagement plan and the eviction of the residents of Gush Katif.

We reacquainted ourselves with the rosy future outlined by defense analysts and politicians who, as it turned out, were also suffering from "pink-colored blindness" given that they predicted a calm, tranquil future in the wake of Israel's withdrawal from Gaza. "The disengagement is good for security," they vowed. The scenarios that they envisioned were far rosier than could be imagined.

If they had the chance to do things differently today, what would they do? We asked those who at the time dismissed the prophecies of doom offered by the skeptics. We were indeed surprised to discover that only a few of them had recanted.

Some of them have appeared on television and radio shows as guest analysts over the course of the past month. With no shortage of self-confidence and brashness, they offered their commentary on how Operation Protective Edge in Gaza Strip was progressing, even going as far as to offer the government and military their advice.

The archives, which document everything, however, do not spare them. The legal petitions against the disengagement submitted to the High Court of Justice by The Legal Forum for the Land of Israel, as well as 11 other plaintiffs, also helped to grasp the full picture.

The petition, which was turned down by the High Court, is a good place to start. It was a legal motion which the state did not even bother to fight. The state did not offer any rebuttal or affidavits intended on supporting the claim that the move was expected to pay dividends in terms of security.

It should be noted that the judges who heard the petition did not lean on the state to provide any explanation. They rejected the cogent, professional arguments, which were backed by evidence and sound defense reasoning offered by the petitioners, who relied up the expertise of Maj. Gen. (res.) Ya'akov Amidror, among others.

The judges refused to visit Gush Katif. They also refused to summon the former chief of staff, Moshe Ya'alon, to the witness stand. They assumed that "the evacuation will dampen the desire of the Palestinians to harm the civilian population," though it is unclear as to where they derived the logic for this argument.

This was a frustrating time for Yossi Fuchs, the attorney arguing the petitions before the High Court. In his view, the judges were "putting up fortified walls" in front of him.

"All of my efforts to ascertain the basis for the state's claims that the security situation would improve [as a result of the withdrawal] crashed against these walls," he said. "I felt that the judges were willfully shutting their eyes for fear that if they opened them, they would be compelled to grant the petition and stop the disengagement plan."

Those who implored the court to listen to the heads of the security services were members of the Knesset's Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee. They discussed the disengagement plan, but the state prevented them from summoning the various defense officials and have them appear before the committee.

Then-Shin Bet security agency chief Yuval Diskin (who declined the request to be interviewed for this article), then-IDF chief and current Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, and Giora Eiland, who at the time served as national security adviser (and who was "too busy" to respond to our questions), were all told that they were barred from appearing before the committee. At the time, all three were very critical of the disengagement plan.

Nonetheless, the state did send one official to represent it before the panel -- Eiland's acting replacement, Itamar Ya'ar, a member of the Council for Peace and Security, an organization which at the time publicly advocated the disengagement plan. Ya'ar mentioned that the move would result in "a significant reduction in the military forces required to maintain day-to-day security in the region."

Then-committee chairman Michael Eitan challenged Ya'ar with competing assessments from experts who said that the withdrawal would whet the appetite of terrorists seeking to expel Israeli forces from the area.

"The decision establishes that, as opposed to what was said here, there will be an overall improvement in the situation," Ya'ar replied.

When Eitan asked Ya'ar which defense experts he cited in his arguments, Ya'ar refused to give a name.

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

Perhaps 'The Gush Katif War' Would Be the More Appropriate Name

...Since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Palestinian terrorists have fired over 14,000 rockets at the Jewish state, which averages out to more than four rockets a day, every day, for nearly a decade. And since the Hamas takeover in 2007, Israel has had to launch three military campaigns to contain the violence: Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, Operation Pillar of Defense in October 2012, and now Operation Protective Edge. But in effect, this has all been one long battle, the Gush Katif War, a conflict that was sparked by Israel's own self-inflicted wound of retreat and expulsion.

Michael Freund..
Pundicity/JPost..
05 August '14..





As the war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas appears to be winding down after more than three weeks of bloodshed, it is time to confront a painful and inconvenient truth.

Though hardly anyone has had the courage to admit as much publicly, the fact is that Operation Protective Edge should never have needed to have been fought.

All the destruction and loss of life, all the economic disruption and diplomatic fallout of recent events did not have to come to pass. Simply put, this conflict is a direct result of the grave and unnecessary strategic errors that Israel made nearly a decade ago, chief among them the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.

Indeed, don't think for a minute that Operation Protective Edge began on July 17, when Israeli ground forces entered the Strip, or that it commenced on July 8, when Israel's air force launched its offensive in response to Hamas rocket fire. The groundwork for this bloody clash was laid precisely nine years ago this week, on the tenth day of the Hebrew month of Av, when Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's government began dismantling Gaza's Jewish communities as part of the so-called disengagement plan.

Despite countless warnings at the time that the Gaza pullout would bring disaster, Sharon pressed ahead, demolishing more than 20 flourishing Jewish communities and withdrawing the IDF from the Strip. This foolhardy move paved the way for the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007, a turning point that has had calamitous consequences for Israel ever since.

Had Israel not uprooted thousands of Jews from their homes, had the government not pulled the army out of Gaza, Hamas would never have been able to seize control over the area, transforming it into a platform for unprecedented terrorist attacks. Thus, through its own reckless actions, the Sharon government helped to create the monster that is now using Gaza to fire rockets at Tel Aviv and to build dozens of underground tunnels.

Frankly, it is chilling to look back and peruse the statements made by various Israeli leaders at the time and to see just how short-sighted and wrong they were about the ramifications of a Gaza retreat. Then-prime minister Sharon, in a meeting with American Jewish leaders in Washington on April 13, 2005, insisted that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza would "reduce terror and give Israeli citizens the maximum level of security. It will increase security for the residents of Israel and relieve the pressure on the IDF and security forces."

Tell that to the millions of Israelis who have been running to bomb shelters in recent weeks as air raid sirens wail eerily in the background.

Monday, August 4, 2014

The Additional Price of Israel’s Gaza Pullout in Palestinian Lives

...This Hamas strategy increases Palestinian casualties in another way as well: by magnifying the impact of any Israeli strike. Precision bombs can sometimes take out a building without touching the ones next to it. But precision strikes don’t work when the building they hit is booby-trapped or serves as a rocket warehouse; in that case, secondary explosions will create a much broader swathe of destruction. And Israel has no way of knowing when a target has been booby-trapped; Hamas doesn’t provide it with maps.

Evelyn Gordon..
Commentary Magazine..
04 August '14..

Last week, I noted that Israel’s unilateral pullout from Gaza has cost the lives of more Israeli soldiers than remaining in Gaza would have. But no less significant is the fact that Israel’s pullout has cost the lives of far more Palestinians than remaining in Gaza would have.

Here, too, a comparison to the second intifada is instructive. According to B’Tselem’s statistics, 1,727 Palestinians were killed in Gaza between September 2000, when the intifada began, and the August 2005 pullout. Since then, the numbers have soared. Another 1,271 Palestinians were killed between the pullout and December 2008, when the first Israel-Hamas war in Gaza began; 1,391 were killed during that war, and 481 between then and the start of the current war. That’s 3,143 Palestinian fatalities in total, and Palestinians claim another 1,600 or so have been killed during this war. So even if you assume, which I do, that B’Tselem’s numbers are exaggerated (it tends to believe Palestinian reports far too uncritically), the trend is undeniable: Since the pullout, Israeli-Palestinian fighting has produced more than twice as many Palestinian fatalities as the peak years of the second intifada did.

Moreover, as in the case of Israeli fatalities, this increase represents a sharp contrast to the trend in the West Bank, which the Israel Defense Forces still control: There, Palestinian fatalities have fallen from 1,491 between September 2000 and August 2005 to 395 in the nine years since August 2005, meaning annual fatalities have fallen by more than 85 percent (they haven’t dropped to zero because neither has Palestinian terror; terror attacks still kill Israelis every year, but the level is dramatically lower than at the height of the intifada).

The question is why Palestinian fatalities in Gaza have risen so sharply. The anti-Israel crowd will doubtless cite this fact as “proof” that recent Israeli premiers are even more bloodthirsty than “the butcher of Beirut,” as they fondly dubbed Ariel Sharon, the prime minister during the second intifada. But anyone not convinced that Ehud Olmert and Benjamin Netanyahu are simply monsters who like eating Palestinian children for breakfast will have to consider the obvious alternative: Palestinian casualties have soared because the IDF’s departure from Gaza allowed terrorist organizations to entrench their rockets, tunnels, and explosives among the civilian population in a way that simply wasn’t possible before.

In the current war, Palestinians have stored rockets in schools and launched them from hospitals and from amid civilian houses. They have built cross-border tunnels to attack Israel that pass under civilian houses and emerge straight into a mosque. They have booby-trapped civilian houses and even health clinics. In short, by embedding their war material among the civilian population, Hamas and other terrorist organizations have made it impossible for the IDF to target them without also hitting civilians.

Thursday, July 31, 2014

Destroying the Last Remaining Justification for Gaza Pullout

...To be clear, I never liked the argument that saving soldiers’ lives was worth the cost of incessant rocket fire on the south; soldiers are supposed to put their lives on the line to protect civilians, not the other way around. But I understand why it was so persuasive to many Israelis: Almost every Israeli has a father, husband, brother, or son in the army, while far fewer have relatives and friends in rocket-battered southern communities; thus many Israelis felt they personally benefited from the tradeoff, even if other Israelis were paying the price. Now, however, even that illusion is gone...


Evelyn Gordon..
Commentary Magazine..
31 July '14..

Has anyone noticed that the last remaining justification for Israel’s unilateral pullout from the Gaza Strip has just disappeared? Proponents’ claims that the pullout would bring peace, security, and international support have long since been disproven; what it actually brought was 16,500 rockets and mortars fired at Israel from Gaza–including 13,800 before the current war began–and unprecedented international vitriol every time Israel tried to fight back (see the current anti-Semitic pogroms in Europe or the infamous Goldstone Report). Yet disengagement supporters still had one trump card to play: “At least our soldiers aren’t dying in Gaza anymore.” And to many Israelis, that gain was worth the terrible price.

But now, Israeli soldiers are once again dying in Gaza, at a rate that wipes out all the gains of the previous few years. Here are the figures, compiled from B’Tselem statistics:

Between the start of the second intifada, in September 2000, and the pullout in August 2005, 87 Israeli soldiers were killed in Gaza. Over the next eight years, it’s not true that no soldiers died in Gaza, but military fatalities did drop significantly: Altogether, 33 soldiers were killed either in Gaza or in southern Israel by fire from Gaza.

Even that “achievement” is actually an indictment of the disengagement, because in the West Bank, which Israel didn’t quit, military fatalities fell far more sharply: from 136 between September 2000 and August 2005 to just 13 in the subsequent nine years. But since Operation Protective Edge began earlier this month, even this meager gain has disappeared: 53 soldiers have so far been killed in or by attacks from Gaza, and the number will likely continue climbing as the operation progresses. In other words, Gaza has now claimed 86 military fatalities from Israel since the pullout–almost identical to the 87 it claimed during the second intifada–even as military fatalities have fallen sharply in the West Bank.

In contrast, had the Israel Defense Forces remained in Gaza, military fatalities would almost certainly have registered a decline similar to that in the West Bank, because Hamas wouldn’t have been able do either of the two things that are now costing so many soldiers their lives: smuggle in vast quantities of sophisticated weaponry or build an extensive network of attack tunnels.

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

Unilateralism - An abject failure and past time to put it to rest as well

...In the event that Israel withdrew from the majority of the West bank and pulled back to its security barrier, not only could it not expect any international recognition for its borders, but experience suggests that it should expect the West Bank to be turned into the same kind of lawless terror launch pad for Iranian proxies that Gaza and southern Lebanon have already now become. Sharon may be buried, but unilateralism is still alive and well. In the future Israelis may yet come to deeply regret not having buried this ideology with its most renowned practitioner when they had the chance.

Tom Wilson..
Commentary Magazine..
13 January '14..

While Israel may have now buried former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, it is still far from having buried with him the idea with which Sharon ultimately came to be most strongly associated: unilateralism–the notion that if no partner for peace could be found, then Israel should determine its own fate, draw its own borders, and extricate itself from a conflict it has long wanted no part in. It was ultimately to this end that Sharon broke from the Likud, and indeed the settlement movement that he had long been the patron of, and established Kadima, the party that would give him the representation in Israel’s Knesset that he needed to carry out the unilateral disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

Sharon had been lying in a comma since early 2006, and despite the abject failure of unilateral disengagement from both Gaza and Lebanon, Sharon’s ideas have not lain dormant with him. Having been a territorial maximalist for most of his political life, unilateral withdrawal from territory may prove to be Sharon’s most significant parting gift to Israel and the region.

Today there is no shortage of politicians in Israel who still espouse the virtues of this strategy. Most notable among them is former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who in a sense first pioneered unilateralism with his disengagement from southern Lebanon in 2000. He was still voicing partial support for unilateral disengagement from the West Bank in 2012. And the idea remains particularly popular among many in Israel’s defense and security establishment. Avi Dichter and Ami Ayalon, both former heads of Israel’s Shin Bet intelligence agency continue to champion this policy, as does Omer Bar-Lev, former head of the general Staff Reconnaissance Unit and a Labor Party member of Israel’s parliament.

Just this weekend Israel’s former ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, was outlining the possibility of withdrawal from much of the West Bank in the not-unlikely event that Israel’s latest round of negotiations with the Palestinian Authority produce no tangible results. In his obituary on Sharon, written for CNN, Oren writes, “A growing number Israelis are asking, ‘What happens if the process fails?’ One solution could be a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian population centers in the West Bank.” Oren suggests how things could be done differently this time, a sign that unilateralists do indeed recognize where the policy has unraveled in the past. Oren explains, “As in the disengagement from Gaza, the United States would endorse this move, but unlike in Gaza, most Israeli settlements would remain within Israel, and Israeli troops would still patrol strategic borders. Of course, the preferable solution is two states for two peoples. But if that proves unattainable, then Israel can still end the occupation of the Palestinians, preserve its security, and perhaps lay new foundations for peace.”

Unilateralism’s great strength is that it refuses to have any delusions about Palestinian intransigence. It refuses to allow Israel to be indefinitely held hostage by the kind of Palestinian rejectionism that has thus far rendered all attempts at a negotiated peace futile. Instead, the unilateralists advocate simply withdrawing to borders of Israel’s choosing. The problem here, however, is that unilateralism is still buying into some of the most fundamental and mistaken premises of the dovish camp in Israel. That is the belief that the conflict is about territory, and that Israel can trade land for peace by giving the Palestinians an agreed upon allotment of territory. Since the Palestinians have so far failed to outline precisely what amount of territory they would require before ending the conflict, negotiations on land for peace have thus far failed to deliver.

The unilateralists seek to bypass stalled negotiations through simply handing over territory to the Palestinians without the framework of peace talks, thus creating a de facto two-state solution. Yet this is a mistake. The two-state proposal is itself an Israeli creation and the Palestinians have never come close to unanimously acknowledging it as a preferable end goal. Israel can create a two-state scenario without Palestinian cooperation if it wants, but there’s no reason to think this will do anything to pacify them.

Both with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and with Hamas in Gaza, Israeli unilateral withdrawal was viewed by the Islamists as a retreat and a sign of weakness. Israelis had demanded nothing in return for the territory they abandoned, they had simply fled. Proof enough for the extremists that terror pays and that Israel’s resolve will always break eventually. In this way unilateral disengagement has emboldened Israel’s enemies to step up their war on Israel, which is not territorial in nature, but existential.

Monday, December 3, 2012

What Could Make an Israeli Party Dangerous?

Jonathan S. Tobin..
Commentary/Contentions..
02 December '12..

Polls don’t show former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni’s new political party having much of an impact on the Israeli electorate, but she is enjoying some success in attracting veteran politicians to her banner. Seven members of the Kadima party that she led in the last elections have jumped over to the Movement, as her party is dubbed. More importantly, she has attracted Amram Mitzna, a former leader of the Labor Party to run with Livni. Mitzna, who led Labor in the 2003 election against Ariel Sharon’s Likud, is likely to be named to the number two slot under Livni. In announcing his decision, Mitzna denounced the administration of Prime Minister Netanyahu as a “failed government” and said the right-wing tilt of the Likud Knesset list made it “dangerous.”

But Mitzna, who was highly regarded for his service as a general in the Israeli army and as mayor of Haifa, is hardly in a position to say the ideas of his opponents are dangerous. Mitzna is, after all, one of the original advocates of one of the worst decisions in the country’s history: the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza that led to the creation of a Hamas terrorist state on Israel’s doorstep.

Friday, November 23, 2012

The trap that Sharon built

Caroline Glick..
carolineglick.com..
23 November '12..

The cease-fire agreement that Israel accepted Wednesday night to end the current round of Palestinian rocket and missile attacks is not a good deal for Israel by any stretch of the imagination.

At best, Israel and Hamas are placed on the same moral plane. The cease-fire erases the distinction between Israel, a peace-seeking liberal democracy that wants simply to defend its citizens, and Hamas, a genocidal jihadist terrorist outfit that seeks the eradication of the Jewish people and the destruction of Israel.

Under international law, Israel is not just within its rights to defend itself from Hamas. It is required to. International law requires all states to treat Hamas terrorists as criminals and deny them safe haven and financing. But the cease-fire agreement requires both the Israeli policeman and the Hamas criminal to hold their fire.

At worst, the cease-fire places Israel beneath Hamas. The first two clauses require both sides to end hostilities. The third suggests Israel is expected to make further concessions to Hamas after the firing stops.

Then there is the cease-fire's elevation of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood government to the role of responsible adult. Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egyptian President Muhamad Morsi openly supports Hamas. Morsi sent his Prime Minister Hesham Kandil to Gaza to personally express the Egyptian government's support for Hamas's criminal assault against Israeli civilians.

Over the weekend, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood held what the media claimed was a stormy meeting. Its members were split over what to do about Israel. Half wanted to go to war with Israel immediately. The other half called for waiting until the Egyptian military is prepared for war. In the end, the voices calling for patient preparation for war won the day.

And for their patience, the Muslim Brothers received the plaudits of the US government. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her boss President Barack Obama were effusive in their praise of the Egyptian government, and joined Egypt in placing Israel on the same moral plane as a terrorist group.

Moreover, Obama and Clinton compelled Israel to accept wording in the cease-fire that arguably makes Egypt the arbiter of Israeli and Palestinian compliance with the agreement.

Aside from the administration's de facto support for the Hamas regime in Gaza, it is hard to think of a greater humiliation than Israel being forced to submit complaints to its sworn enemy about the actions of the sworn enemy's terrorist client.

And yet, for all of that, it isn't clear that Israel had a better option than to sign on the dotted line. Israel might have gotten better results if Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak had ordered the ground forces poised at the border to take out a few Hamas ground installations. It certainly would make sense for Israel to end Gaza's electricity supply.

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Bret Stephens - The Truth About Gaza

Bret Stephens..
Wall Street Journal..
19 November '12..

Sometimes it behooves even a pundit to acknowledge his mistakes. In 2004 as editor of the Jerusalem Post, and in 2006 in this column, I made the case that Israel was smart to withdraw its soldiers and settlers from the Gaza Strip. I was wrong.

My error was to confuse a good argument with good policy; to suppose that mere self-justification is a form of strategic prudence. It isn't. Israel is obviously within its rights to defend itself now against a swarm of rockets and mortars from Gaza. But if it had maintained a military presence in the Strip, it would not now be living under this massive barrage.

Or, to put it another way: The diplomatic and public-relations benefit Israel derives from being able to defend itself from across a "border" and without having to get into an argument about settlements isn't worth the price Israelis have had to pay in lives and terror.

That is not the way it seemed to me in 2004, when then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to pull up stakes, reversing the very policy he had done so much to promote as a general and politician in the 1970s. Gaza, I argued, was vital neither to the Jewish state's security nor to its identity. It was a drain on Israel's moral, military, political and diplomatic resources. Getting out of the Strip meant shaving off nearly half of the Palestinian population (and the population with the highest birthrate), thereby largely solving Israel's demographic challenge.

Withdrawal also meant putting the notion of land-for-peace to a real-world test. Would Gazans turn the Strip into a showcase Palestinian state, a Mediterranean Dubai, or into another Beirut circa 1982? If the former, then Israel could withdraw from the West Bank with some confidence. If the latter, it would put illusions to rest, both within Israel and throughout the Western world.

Finally, I argued that while direct negotiations with the Palestinians had proved fruitless for Israel, Jerusalem could use its withdrawal from Gaza to obtain political and security guarantees from the United States. That's just what Mr. Sharon appeared to get through an exchange of formal letters with George W. Bush in April 2004.

Things didn't work out as I had hoped. To say the least.

Wednesday, August 8, 2012

(IMRA Audio) Ehud Yaari on additional benefits of the 2005 Gaza disengagement

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA..
08 August '12..



Arab affairs analyst Ehud Yaari on IDF Radio "Hakol Boer" 7 August 2012 blames PM Ariel Sharon's 2005 Disengagement from the Gaza Strip for radicalization of Sinai


Published on Aug 8, 2012 by

And today we see these people, who were never close to Islam, and certainly not to fanaticism and fundamentalism.

Some of them underwent a transformation. We know why.

We can lie to ourselves a thousand times why this happened. I can tell you why it happened because I hear it from the Bedouin themselves. It happened because of the Disengagement of 2005.

How does Ashaf Hanani, one the prominent Bedouin intellectuals in Sinai put it? And there are such.

He says "a fireball rolled from Gaza to Egypt. First northeast Sinai integrated into the Gaza economy via the smuggling and tunnel industry. The second thing. The flow and influence of Hamas and Salafi ideology from Gaza to tribes in Sinai. "

This is what happened.

Original title: Ehud Yaari blames radicalization of Sinai on the 2005 Disengagement
Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FO_Ek2cw090&feature=youtu.be

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Friday, March 16, 2012

Honig - Marie in Morag

Sarah Honig..
Another Tack..
16 March '12..

More than anything, Marie Colvin, who was laid to rest Monday, will be remembered for sacrificing her life for the London Sunday Times’ circulation figures (albeit pro forma in the name of intrepid reporting on the siege of Homs). Her immortality in the annals of journalism is guaranteed.

With that in mind, it’d be especially instructive for us to recall one of her eyewitness accounts which is most pertinent to our own circumstances.

It was published nearly six years ago – in April 2006, only a few months after we disengaged from Gaza.

Colvin tossed the truth about our self-bamboozlement directly in our faces. This perhaps was why that specific item generated near-zero resonance among us. Why focus on the unpleasant even if it’s the straightforward bottom line with profound implications for our possible future follow- up follies?

If there’s anything we dislike, it’s to be confronted with evidence of our own inexcusable imbecility.

Colvin unceremoniously gave us the facts. It was left up to us to draw conclusions which our establishment and Left-dominated media scoffed at. Therefore, Colvin’s singularly unpalatable feature never made our headlines back in the day.

That in itself poses something of a riddle. One would expect our agenda-driven press to lap up her material, because Colvin was never remotely renowned for being a lover of Zion.

Monday, March 12, 2012

Tobin - Revisiting the Failed Gaza Experiment

Jonathan S. Tobin..
Commentary/Contentions..
12 March '12..



This past weekend, southern Israel was hit by more than 200 rockets flying over the border from Hamas-controlled Gaza. Dozens of the missiles were intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defense system but most got through with some casualties and damage. The lives of more than a million Israelis living in the southern part of the country were disrupted by the assault. Schools were closed as the population was urged to take shelter until the latest crisis passed.

To the extent the world is paying much attention to this (it was overshadowed by the story of the American soldier who murdered Afghan civilians) it has been in the form of the usual “cycle of violence” stories that depict the situation as one in which both Israel and the Palestinians are seen as being at fault. As is generally the case, the focus quickly shifts to efforts to reinstate a cease-fire, with Secretary of State Clinton condemning the missile fire while also calling for both sides to show “restraint.” But the real issue here is not who started it or how well the Iron Dome system is working. It is the way Israel must learn to live with an independent Palestinian state in Gaza in all but name that is run by terrorists. Those who continue to demand Israel withdraw completely from the West Bank and Jerusalem, as they did from Gaza in 2005, need to understand the lessons of that failed experiment will not be forgotten.

Thursday, August 19, 2010

The 'disengagement' disaster, five years on


by Jeff Jacoby
The Boston Globe
18 August '10

FIVE YEARS AGO THIS WEEK, the Gaza Strip was forcibly purged of its Jews. In the largest non-combat operation in the history of the Israeli Defense Forces, 50,000 troops were deployed to expel some 9,000 residents and destroy the 21 pioneering communities in which some of them had lived for nearly four decades. (Four communities in northern Samaria on the West Bank were also evacuated.)

The name given to this expulsion by Israel's government, then headed by Ariel Sharon, was "disengagement." The name implied, and a majority of Israelis appeared to believe, that by totally withdrawing from Gaza they would no longer be trapped in a dysfunctional relationship with Gaza's hostile and sometimes violent Arabs.

"What will we have gained by destroying thriving communities, dividing Israeli society, and embittering some of our most idealistic citizens?" one thoughtful Israeli commentator, Yossi Klein Halevi, wrote at the time in The Jerusalem Post. "The most obvious . . . gain is what we will lose: We will be freeing ourselves from more than a million Palestinians."

Many Israelis -- and many supporters of Israel internationally -- bought this argument, persuaded, perhaps, by the Sharon government's sweeping vision of the blessings that would flow from so radical an act of ethnic self-cleansing. "It will be good for us and will be good for the Palestinians," forecast then-Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was to succeed Sharon a few months later. "It will bring more security, greater safety, much more prosperity, and a lot of joy for all the people that live in the Middle East." Olmert prayed that with disengagement, "a new morning of great hope will emerge in our part of the world," and that Israelis and Palestinians together would make the Middle East "what it was destined to be from the outset, a paradise for all the world."

Had any of this actually come to pass, the trauma and destruction of the Gaza expulsion might have been justifiable. In fact, disengagement was a staggering failure, a disaster in every respect. It was seen by most Palestinians not as a courageous act of goodwill and an invitation to peace, but as a retreat under fire, much like the Israeli flight from southern Lebanon five years earlier. It led therefore not to less terrorism but to more, as Palestinian militants vastly expanded their arsenal of rockets, guns, and explosives, and launched thousands of attacks over the border into Israel.

(Read full story)

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Wednesday, June 16, 2010

Critic, investigate thyself


Soccer Dad
16 June '10

The PA's Abbas isn't happy that Israel chose to investigate its actions regarding the attack on Israeli commandos by terrorists on the Mavi Marmara.

"We totally agreed with the inquiring commission that was mentioned in the final declaration by the Security Council ... The proposal that Israel took today does not correspond with the requirements of the Security Council," Abbas said at a joint press conference with French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Elysee Palace.

According to the Security Council's proposal on June 1, the Israeli authority should launch "a transparent, credible, impartial and rapid inquiry, in line with international criteria," for the incident.


Of course transparency in government is not something Abbas, whose sons own a valuable stake in the Palestinian cellular company, would necessarily understand.

Funny thing is that, despite the double standards, Israel does indeed investigate itself. And it just issued a report.

The report, which examined efforts by the government to resettle the 9,000 people removed from 21 communities in the Gaza Strip and four in northern Samaria, documented how the state had failed to properly compensate the evacuees, resulting in a bevy of social problems for those forced to relocate.

"Five years after the evacuation, an examination of the results discloses an extremely dismal picture: Most of the evacuees are still living in temporary caravan sites; the construction of most of the permanent housing has not yet commenced; the decisive majority of the public structures in the evacuees' new settlements have not yet been built; the rate of unemployment among the evacuees is double the rate of unemployment in the general population; the economic state of some of the evacuees is very bad, and there are more than a few among them in need of assistance from the welfare entities... it was therefore found that the work of rehabilitating the evacuees is far from completed," the report states.

(Read full post)

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Monday, June 7, 2010

It's Time to End the Blockade of Gaza


Daniel Greenfield
Sultan Knish
06 June '10

Like virtually every political step Israel has taken since 1991, the Disengagement from Gaza and the blockade of Hamas was done under the assumption that if Israel took the most moderate path possible (short of actual national suicide) the world community would be reasonable about it and work together to isolate the "extremists" and stabilize the region. That assumption has been repeatedly shown to be false. The world is not interested in being reasonable. It has no litmus test that Muslim terrorists can ever fail, and no test that Israel can ever pass.

Israel's Border Wall and the Blockade of Gaza were bare minimum attempts by Israel to isolate itself from the terrorists, and isolate the terrorists from their arms suppliers in Iran and Syria. Not only did Israel give a free hand to Hamas, an Islamic group whose sole purpose is to wipe it out, but it continued allowing in aid and even provided medical assistance to Gaza residents. Both the Wall and the Blockade had the initial backing of the United States and a number of European governments. After all blockades were not a new tactic to the US and every country understood the legitimacy of having a border fence to protect your own border.

But instead, the Wall was dubbed the Apartheid Wall, despite the fact that there were about as many Arabs on one side of it as another, and that the Arabs on the other side of it claimed to be members of a separate Palestinian nation. And the Blockade was redefined as Israeli piracy and oppression against the not particularly starving "People of Gaza". The Obama administration along with Europe is now calling for an end to the blockade. And Israel has a choice between either fighting a continuous war against naval incursions from Turkey and Iran, with leftist "Human Shields" to provide cover for the terrorists-- or reclaiming control over Gaza and driving out Hamas.

The arguments for reclaiming Gaza are straightforward enough.

The situation as it stands cannot be settled through any form of negotiation, as Hamas has made it clear that under no circumstances will it accept any form of permanent peace agreement, only temporary truces. The world is no longer demanding that Israel negotiate with terrorists, as it had in the past with the PLO. Instead it is demanding that Israel stop interfering with the terrorists. Not because this will bring peace through negotiations, but because they have accepted the national claims of Hamas, a genocidal Islamist terrorist organization. This is obviously an unsustainable and unacceptable demand.

(Read full article)

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