There are lessons from the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict - by Michael Rubin

...Are there lessons from the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict? Yes. First, the United Nations does not bring peace but only delays war. Its promises are empty. UN observers and peacekeepers are often less interested in keeping peace than in feeding at the international trough and sending remittances back home. To place trust in the United Nations or the attention span of European diplomats and even the State Department is foolish. Diplomacy empowers terrorists, it does not defeat them. Nor does it do any favors for peace.

Michael Rubin..
Commentary Magazine..
12 August '16..
Link: https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/lessons-of-lebanon-hezbollah-10-years-on/

This Sunday marks the ten-year anniversary of the end of the 34-day Israel-Hezbollah War in Lebanon. The war began when Hezbollah crossed into Israeli territory from southern Lebanon, killed three soldiers, injured two others, and kidnapped two more. While Lebanon professed its innocence, it had made a conscience choice to allow Hezbollah to assert its primacy along its southern border following Israeli’s UN-certified withdrawal in May 2000. Israel’s war aims were to eradicate Hezbollah missile stockpiles and Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon. While the Israeli military succeeded in knocking out many Hezbollah stockpiles, the Iranian-backed Shi’ite militia managed to launch hundreds of missiles and rockets, striking as far south as Haifa and killing several dozen Israelis.

A chorus of international officials called for Israel to cease its attacks at once. French President Jacques Chirac condemned Israel’s actions as “completely disproportionate,” and Russian President Vladimir Putin called Israel’s “use of full-scale force” unacceptable. Even U.S. officials chimed in. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned, “It is extremely important that Israel exercse restraint in its acts of self-defense.” Hillary Clinton, then a New York senator, doubled down on the call for an immediate ceasefire and demanded the United States and Israel resolve the situation diplomatically. “We’ve had five and a half years of a failed experiment in tough talk absent diplomacy and engagement,” she said. “I think it’s time to go back to what works, and what has historically worked and what can work again.”

By diplomacy, European officials, Clinton, and eventually the Bush administration meant the problem should be punted back to the United Nations. There was some irony in this, especially since Hezbollah had armed and launched its attack under the watch of UNIFIL, the UN monitoring agency in southern Lebanon. Still, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan promised a bigger, better (and more expensive) UN monitoring force to keep the peace if only hostilities would stop. “It is urgent that the international community acts to make a difference on the ground,” he said, “The force will be larger, the way I see it, much larger than the 2000-man force we have there.” British Prime Minister also endorsed an international force. “The only way we are going to have a cessation of violence is if we have an international force deployed into that area,” he explained.

How the Arab World’s Anti-Israel Pathology Helped Ruin Syria - by Evelyn Gordon

...The realization that their hatred of Israel has ended up hurting Arab states more than it has their intended victim is undoubtedly one of the drivers behind these countries’ budding rapprochement with Israel, as reflected most recently in Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry’s visit to Jerusalem this week. Unfortunately, that epiphany has come too late for battered, bleeding Syria, and for all the other countries now suffering the fallout from its ongoing civil war.

Evelyn Gordon..
Commentary Magazine..
15 July '16..
Link: https://www.commentarymagazine.com/uncategorized/israel-hatred-helped-ruin-syria/

Israel-hatred isn’t the only reason for the Mideast’s current meltdown, but it has undoubtedly played a significant role. As an example, consider how Lebanon was rebuilt after Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel–and then consider how that reconstruction ended up enabling the bloodbath in Syria today.

The Second Lebanon War began ten years ago this week, when Hezbollah killed three Israeli soldiers and abducted two in a cross-border raid, despite Israel’s withdrawal from every inch of Lebanon six years earlier. Yet Hezbollah paid no public price for starting a war that devastated southern Lebanon; instead, it became the darling of the Arab world for emerging undefeated (if also un-victorious) from a month-long fight against the hated Zionist enemy and achieving the then-unprecedented feat of launching some 4,000 rockets at Israel’s civilian population.

This halo effect was able to survive past the first flush of victory mainly because the devastation was quickly repaired, thereby mitigating the suffering of Hezbollah’s Shi’ite base. But Hezbollah couldn’t have done this alone; it didn’t have the money. And though its Iranian patron made cash payments to families left homeless, Tehran’s money went primarily toward rebuilding Hezbollah’s arsenal.

So who actually cleaned up the mess left by Hezbollah’s war? “With all due respect to Tehran, most of the rebuilding efforts were shouldered by wealthy Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, which donated hundreds of millions of dollars,” reporter Jack Khoury wrote in Haaretz this week. “Qatar alone donated more than $300 million and took charge of rebuilding houses in the 30 hardest-hit communities.” And those houses weren’t just rebuilt; they were made even bigger and better than before.

The Sunni Arab states didn’t shell out lavish reconstruction aid because of any fondness for Shi’ite Hezbollah or its Shi’ite Iranian patron. In fact, the Saudis openly condemned Hezbollah for starting the war. Nor were they motivated mainly by compassion, as evidenced by the cold shoulder they have given victims of the far greater devastation wrought by Syria’s civil war (the Gulf States are notorious for refusing to accept Syrian refugees).

Rather, given the Arab world’s loathing for Israel, these countries felt they simply couldn’t afford to appear unsupportive of “Israel’s victims”–especially since Hezbollah, despite starting an unnecessary war that wreaked havoc on its own population, had become an Arab hero for doing so. Consequently, they joined forces to rebuild Lebanon.

Had this not happened, the Lebanese might have turned against Hezbollah for causing them lasting damage, leaving it irreparably weakened. Instead, it became even stronger: Not only was it a hero, but it had the financial clout to get the country rebuilt. Within two years, it had become Lebanon’s de facto ruler, a position it retains to this day.

Now fast forward five years to the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011. The war has so far killed over 400,000 people and displaced more than half the country’s population. This includes 4.8 million who fled to Syria’s neighbors, thereby destabilizing countries like Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon.

The war of 2006 was not a Lebanese war. It was an Iranian war. - by Caroline Glick

The war Israel fought in the summer of 2006 against Hezbollah was not the same as the war Israel fought against the PLO in 1982. The war of 2006 was not a Lebanese war. It was an Iranian war.

Caroline Glick..
Our World/JPost..
11 July '16..
Link: http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Our-World-The-first-Iran-war-460106..

July 12, 2006 was the first day of what has become known as the Second Lebanon War. The name of the war, like most of the lessons taken from it, is off.

The war Israel fought in the summer of 2006 against Hezbollah was not the same as the war Israel fought against the PLO in 1982. The war of 2006 was not a Lebanese war. It was an Iranian war.

It was the first Iran war.

Hezbollah, acting as Iran’s foreign legion, initiated the war with a massive mortar and rocket assault on communities in northern Israel. Under mortar cover, a Hezbollah unit crossed the border and attacked an IDF convoy traveling close to Kibbutz Zarit.

Five soldiers were killed in the missile attack. Members of the Hezbollah squad stole the bodies of two of the dead, IDF reservists Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser and spirited them to Lebanon.

A rescue mission to bring them back failed, after the tank, tasked with the job was hit by a land mine. Five more soldiers were killed.

Hezbollah’s assault was not the opening salvo of the war. That happened two and a half weeks earlier along the border with Gaza. The July 12 attack was a carbon copy of Hamas’s June 25 assault.

At dawn that day, Hamas forces opened a salvo of mortar fire on IDF positions along the border with Gaza. Under cover of the fire, a Hamas cell penetrated Israel through an underground tunnel. The terrorists attacked a tank, killing two soldiers and abducting IDF corporal Gilad Shalit.

Following the opening assault, Hamas maintained its mortar, missile and rocket offensive against Israel for weeks.

In 2006, Hamas acted as a wholly-owned and operated Iranian proxy. Iran began massively funding the Muslim Brotherhood group in 2005. Hamas operatives, like their Hezbollah counterparts and colleagues from the Muslim Brotherhood in Sinai, were brought to Iran for training. Iran smuggled massive quantities of weaponry to Gaza, through Egypt.

In other words, the misnamed Second Lebanon War was a two-front war. It was a coordinated assault on Israel by two Iranian controlled terror armies. They operated with a near identical doctrine and operations guide, albeit, with different capabilities.

Failing to recognize this fact, either during the war or afterwards, Israel’s military leadership has yet to learn the appropriate lessons from the war. Both then and now, the IDF senior brass takes a myopic view of war. The enemy is not a larger force, coordinating and directing operations on the ground that it is the IDF’s job to defeat, the enemy is what you see. And you don’t need to think past your rifle sights.

Ten Years - Reflections on the Second Lebanon War by Jonathan Spyer

...we should be thankful for those who came before us. Lebanon 2006 shows that even at a low point in terms of training and planning, led by an unsuitable chief of staff, with an inexperienced and as it turns out largely corrupt political leadership at the helm, Israel’s armed forces were still of sufficient quality to be capable of delivering a blow to a powerful enemy instructive enough to ensure a period of subsequent silence, which lasts to this day. Broader regional circumstances beyond the control of either Israelis or Lebanese Shias have certainly added to this effect. The main question, though – whether Israeli society and its armed forces have sufficiently internalized and acted on the lessons taught in the burning summer of 2006 – remains a subject of daily relevance to which a final answer can not yet be given.

Jonathan Spyer..
Middle East Analysis and Reportage..
jonathanspyer.com..
23 June '16..

10 years since the Second Lebanon War. For those of us who took part in it, that war remains, always just in view. Like a suitcase filled with items of vivid memory, waiting quietly in the corner of a room.

It was an entirely inglorious and partially botched and inconclusive affair. A ‘great and grave missed opportunity’ as the second report of the Winograd Committee termed it.

It has also been rapidly forgotten. This, it seems, is the way of the small wars that Israel fights these days. None of them passes into legend, as did the great conflicts of the states’s foundation. Today’s conflicts, after a short time, become largely the private property of those who participated in them.

That’s perhaps not a bad thing. Perhaps it is akin to the rapidity with which Israeli cities clear up and move on after terror attacks. Still, the long quiet that has followed the 2006 war on the northern border has helped to further obscure some of the lessons of that summer. It is worth therefore recalling, in unforgiving focus, some of what took place.

A Cabinet led by individuals with minimal security experience (and a prime minister and president now serving jail terms), and an IDF led by its first chief of staff from the Air Force set out for war with the Iranian proxy Hizballah organization on July 12th, 2006.

It is now evident that no coherent and achievable plan for the conduct of the war had been decided at the rushed and overheated Cabinet meeting that set it in motion.

This problematic, unprepared leadership was in turn commanding an army ill-suited for the war it would need to fight.

There were two reasons for the IDF’s state of unreadiness:

(Continue to Full Article)

Updates throughout the day at http://calevbenyefuneh.blogspot.com. If you enjoy "Love of the Land", please be a subscriber. Just put your email address in the "Subscribe" box on the upper right-hand corner of the page.Twitter updates at LoveoftheLand as well as our Love of the Land page at Facebook which has additional pieces of interest besides that which is posted on the blog. Also check-out This Ongoing War by Frimet and Arnold Roth. An excellent blog, very important work. 

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"There are no other forces to do the job for you."

"But in war everyone is busy and everyone is fighting and you are left on your own limited angle. You stand alone with your troops and feel the fate of the campaign is on the balance.

Yoav Zitun..
Israel News/Ynet..
16 June '13..

The Second Lebanon War will mark its seventh anniversary next month, but even after a prolonged calm, the IDF, and especially Golani Brigade, are preparing for another bout with Hezbollah.

Lieutenant Colonel Barak Hiram, commander of Battalion 51 in the brigade, suffered head injuries in combat with Hezbollah fighters in Kafr Hadata during the 2006 war, but the injury did not deter Hiram, then battalion commander in the Egoz Reconnaissance Unit, who insisted on returning to the front the moment his wounds healed.

In the battle, Hiram led a force on a charge against the Hezbollah fighters who opened fire on his troops while they were evacuating soldiers hurt in a previous engagement.

Hiram stayed in the same spot the whole night after the opposing force was vanquished despite his heavy injury, so as not to expose his soldiers.

But few in the brigade or even in his battalion know Hiram lost an eye in that battle, for which he won a citation by the Northern Command's Gaash Formation commander.

During his convalescence he was implanted with a glass eye, but this handicap did not prevent him from leading hundreds of men last week to a wide-scale battalion drill starting in the Lower Galilee and continuing to the Golan Heights.

(Video) Israel, Resilience, and Victory for One Exceptional Officer

LOTL..
02 February '13..

During the Second Lebanon War, Officer Asael Lubotzky from the esteemed Golani Infantry Brigade, was admitted to Rambam Health Care Campus after being seriously wounded from a direct anti-tank missile at the site of what became known as the Battle of Bint Jbeil.

Now, almost 7 years later we pick-up the story of Asael Lubotzky, critically wounded by Hezbollah terrorists, as he dramatically transforms from victim to healer.


AishVideo Uploaded 06 February '13

Further reading: Victory for One Exceptional Officer - The Story of Asael Lubotzky

Purchase Asael Lubotzki's moving memoir that is written in Hebrew: http://www.ybook.co.il/%D7%9E%D7%9F_%...

Updates throughout the day at http://calevbenyefuneh.blogspot.com. If you enjoy "Love of the Land", please be a subscriber. Just put your email address in the "Subscribe" box on the upper right-hand corner of the page.Twitter updates at LoveoftheLand as well as our Love of the Land page at Facebook.

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Livni's Folly – UN Security Council 1701

Dr. Aaron Lerner..
IMRA Weekly Commentary..
27 December '12..

Fans of Tzipi Livni like to assert that she demonstrated her skills in diplomacy when she ostensibly stood firm on the right of return in her talks with Palestinians – refusing to allow any refugees in. But the fact is that those talks were only a cover for the real negotiations the Prime Minister Olmert was carrying out at the very same time with Mahmoud Abbas. Negotiations during which Olmert offered incredible concessions – including the return of refugees. So given that the Livni talks weren’t the real talks, and that it is reasonable to assume that Livni also knew that this was the case, it’s stretch to draw any conclusions about Livni's true capabilities from these essentially fake talks.

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 that concluded the Lebanon war, on the other hand, is a different story. Then Foreign Minister Livni was Israel's point man on 1701.

1701 has been a farce. The international force never stopped the flow of weapons. Hizbullah deployed up to the fence. In fact, when their weapons blow up they bar the international force from even approaching the area. It is interesting to read what Livni said herself about UNSC 1701 in a briefing she held on August 13, 2006 following Israel's acceptance of 1701.

The Fire This Time:

How the IDF must avoid the pitfalls of the 2006 and 2008 campaigns

Robert Werdine..
Times of Israel..
21 November '12..

Following Hezbollah’s cross border kidnapping in July 2006, Israel responded by attempting, to the greatest possible extent, to destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure and weaponry, neutralize them as a military force, and force their removal north of the Litani. They also hoped that a favorable political diminishment of Hezbollah within Lebanon would follow the successful military campaign.

Dismissing the need for an overwhelming combined arms assault, IDF Chief of Staff Halutz first opted for an improvised air assault punctuated with small-bore border forays. After a week of air assaults and standoff attacks the decisive victory promised by Halutz was, however, nowhere in sight. Hezbollah was just as firmly entrenched along the border and south of the Litani as they ever were, and rockets were still popping into northern Israel at 100 or more a day.

Then Halutz deployed company and battalion sized assaults to raid and engage Hezbollah strongholds near the border. The IDF deployed battalion and company size units into Maroun al-Ras, Bint J’Bail, and elsewhere, where they encountered well trained Hezbollah militants who ambushed them with a skill and a ferocity that shook them.

By the third week of the campaign, the IDF now decided to increase the forces on the ground and by August 12 Operation Change Direction 11, an advance of 4 divisions, including a westward drive of 162 Division from At Tayyibeh to link up with elements of the Nahal Brigade that had been airlifted into position there near Ghanduriyih, had commenced. The ground campaign lasted two days, each division advanced several miles, killed some Hezbollah, occupied some strategically dubious territory, and accomplished absolutely nothing of significance. To emphasize this failure, Hezbollah tossed a few hundred rockets into Israel on the last day of the campaign.

Hizb'Allah's leader Nasrallah's glorious victory - He managed to survive.

Dr. Mordechai Kedar..
Middle East and Terrorism..
18 October '12..

The Second Lebanon War ended in August 2006, after thirty three days of Israeli attacks that resulted in the deaths of 1300 Lebanese, most of whom were Hizb'Allah militants, the destruction of infrastructure and buildings, and half a million people becoming refugees, having fled from South Lebanon. Despite this, Hizb'Allah's propaganda has managed to change the actual rout into a perceived victory, because Hizb'Allah's leader - Hassan Nasrallah, managed to survive, and because he did not hand surrender the two kidnapped IDF soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, may G-d avenge their blood, and because he did not agree to disarm Hizb'Allah, the excuse being that these weapons are intended for fighting the Zionist enemy and liberating the occupied lands.

Hizb'Allah has become the most popular organization in the Arab world, because it succeeded where all the other Arab armies failed, and Nasrallah has become a national Arab hero because of his courage and tenacity of purpose. The Arab world ignored the fact that Hizb'Allah is a Shi'ite organization while the great majority in the Arab world are Sunnis, and the fact that Hizb'Allah is an extension of Iran. The Arab admiration of Nasrallah in 2006 soared exceedingly. Despite the strengthening of UNIFIL and the broadening of its mandate following Resolution 1701 of the Security Council, the border between Lebanon and Syria continued to be a wide open thoroughfare for the missiles, weapons and ammunition that have been streaming in undisturbed from Iran via Syria to Lebanon. Hizb'Allah has been restored and strengthened by the joint efforts of Syria and Iran, and owes its existence to both of them. If it wasn't for Hafez and Bishar Asad, and the imams Khomeini and Khamenei, the Shi'ite community in Lebanon would have remained marginalized and neglected, with an aging militia, Amal.

Shapira - Hizbullah's Predicament in Light of Syria's Decline

Dr. Shimon Shapira
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Vol. 11, No. 10
31 July 2011


Click here for original link

Five years after the Second Lebanon War, a war whose results Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah considers a "divine victory," Hizbullah has currently reached one of its lowest points due to the endangered survival of the Assad regime in Syria, as well as the international tribunal that has demanded the extradition of four Hizbullah members suspected of murdering former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

Damascus functions as the primary bridge between Iran and Hizbullah in terms of all military and other assistance arriving from Tehran. This comes on top of the direct transfer of rocket and missile weaponry from the Syrian army's arms depots to Hizbullah's fighting units.

Hizbullah has adopted a clear-cut stand in support of Bashar Assad, and therefore Hizbullah flags are being burned in the streets of Syria together with Nasrallah's portrait. Without Syrian backing, Hizbullah will find it hard to continue dictating political moves in Lebanon.

Recent signs of Hizbullah's weakened position include the public revelation of an espionage network run by the CIA of people in important positions within the movement; the open sale of alcoholic beverages in Nabatiye, Hizbullah's capital in southern Lebanon; and the attempt by the Lebanese government to appoint a security chief for Beirut International Airport from within the Maronite community, contrary to Hizbullah's wishes.

In light of all this, Nasrallah is looking for a new pretext to confront Israel, focusing this time on the gas fields that Israel is developing within its maritime economic zone. Nasrallah believes his threats will distract attention from the decline in Hizbullah's status and the international accusations that it currently faces.

Hassan Nasrallah delivered an address on July 26, 2011, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Second Lebanon War. He recounted the war's achievements from his perspective, including Hizbullah's increased military build-up and its power to deter an Israel that is frantically maneuvering to protect its civilian rear. As a result, Israel has strictly preserved the quiet in southern Lebanon. Nasrallah made it clear that Israeli warnings about "surprises" that it was preparing for Hizbullah in the event of a military confrontation were merely psychological warfare that was doomed to fail. In response to the demands by the international tribunal in The Hague (STL) to extradite Hizbullah members accused of murdering former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, Nasrallah observed that the accused are examples of the "honorable resistance" and they would not be extradited.1


Nasrallah used the occasion to make it clear that in addition to acting as the defender of Lebanese security, henceforth he would also protect the Lebanese state's natural resources. "Lebanon now has a real chance to become a wealthy state since treasures of natural gas and oil lie opposite its shores." "These treasures do not belong to any sect or party, but constitute the national treasures of the Lebanese state and are valued at billions of dollars. This represents an opportunity to improve living conditions in Lebanon and pay off the Lebanese state's debts. This is a golden opportunity and we must behave responsibly." Israel claims about 850 km of maritime waters that contain Lebanese gas and oil and Israel has no rights to this gas and oil, Nasrallah said.

Op-ed - Lebanon War distortions

Abraham Bell, Gerald M. Steinberg
Israel Opinion/Ynet
31 July '11

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4102602,00.html



Op-ed: Study shows NGOs issued baseless, fabricated accusations against Israel

This summer marks the five-year anniversary of the Lebanon war between Israel and the Lebanese-Iranian terrorist organization Hezbollah. The Second Lebanon War traumatized Israel politically as well as militarily. Militarily, Israel failed to dislodge the terrorist organization from its southern Lebanese foothold; politically, Israeli leaders found themselves overwhelmed by a flood of false accusations of “war crimes,” “indiscriminate and disproportionate” force, and “violations of international law.”

International non-governmental organizations played a critical role in the political warfare against Israel. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International – ostensibly neutral watchdogs – led the campaign. In 35 days, they issued over 40 press releases, statements and pseudo fact-finding reports, comprising hundreds of pages, largely ignoring the war crimes committed by the terrorist organization and instead focusing overwhelmingly and negatively on alleged Israeli crimes.

The HRW and Amnesty allegations were immediately accepted, at face value, by the world’s media. Politicians and diplomats then echoed the war crimes accusations, without any fact-checking.

We are now completing a multi-year study of all the HRW and Amnesty allegations regarding the 2006 Lebanon war, and the results so far are shocking. In our systematic and detailed research, supported by the Israel Science Foundation, we found major contradictions as well as numerous unsupported charges, double standards and false or invented “evidence.”

The Rabbi and the Paratroopers

geulanow
May 26, 2011





A wonderful, heartwarming story about Rabbi Yitzchak Dovid Grossman, from Migdal HaEmek, and paratroopers from the IDF's Brigade 85 during the Second Lebanon War.



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Hizballah Prepares for War Based on Using Civilians as Shields

Barry Rubin
The Rubin Report
19 July '10

The Israeli army has released for the first time sensitive intelligence data on how Hizballah is digging into southern Lebanon. The deliberate strategy is to store weapons and put defense positions right next to civilian houses. In the event of a war, Israel will have to choose between giving Hizballah a tremendous advantage or killing civilians.

Or as a Lebanese person remarked privately, "Hizballah is painting a big fat target on all the Shi'a down there."



This strategy is the fruit of the world reaction to the 2008-2009 war in the Gaza Strip when Hamas was rewarded for using civilians as human shields. Despite the care Israel took to avoid damaging civilian property or endangering civilian lives, there was a strong anti-Israel response. Given that behavior, others will no doubt follow this approach in future, thus leading to more suffering for civilians and stronger radical totalitarian movements, which will also oppress people where they hold power.

Remember this material when Hizballah sets off the next war and the inevitable media and other complaints against Israel begin: These condemnations will be based on--and will, in turn---reinforce a cynical and vicious deliberate effort by terrorist groups.

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Israel’s fateful withdrawal

Lebanon exit marked zenith of Israel’s shift from offensive to defensive posture


Gabriel Siboni
Israel Opinion/Ynet
01 July '10

(Dr. Gabriel Siboni heads the Military and Strategy research program at the Institute for National Security Studies. Last week, it held a convention titled “The Withdrawal from Lebanon: 10 years later,” attended by Defense Minister Ehud Barak, former military leaders, and senior researchers.)

The withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 constitutes a significant and special event; an attempt to shape our security reality in the north unilaterally, while aiming to elicit broad international recognition.

The withdrawal marked the zenith of a significant change in the characteristics of Israel’s security doctrine. It appears that we still cannot formulate a clear answer to the question of whether it was a planned move that stemmed from strategic-political thinking, or whether it stemmed from the “peer pressure” that dominated the public discourse in previous years.

Related: In praise of wars of choice

It is possible that the withdrawal’s execution in practice, with all parties being surprised by the timing (including the IDF, South Lebanon Army, and Hezbollah) had some weight in respect to entrenching the attitude to the pullout both within the Israeli public and among Hezbollah members. Yet more than anything else, the withdrawal indicted a doctrinal change whereby Israel shifted from an offensive to a defensive approach.

Israel’s security strategy was set by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and premised on a defense strategy that allows for offense as a systematic-tactical component; hence, Israel developed offensive perception vis-à-vis terror organizations. Over the years, the IDF continuously implemented an offensive military policy that did not allow the terror threat to develop. This offensive approach maintained a low-level threat.

The years of our war on terror are replete with examples of offensive operations against terror groups in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. These operations assisted Israel in suppressing and maintaining terror groups’ capabilities at a low and relatively stable level, while creating a complex security reality that was limited to borderline communities.

Yet the longer the IDF stayed in Lebanon, the more we saw a gradual process of abandoning the offensive approach and adopting a clear defensive posture. The number of offensive operations declined, the operational freedom of commanders on the ground was considerably limited, and every operation produced limitations for future operations. As a result of this, we saw the emergence of an operational reality that made it difficult to continue adopting the offensive approach. All this was happening against the backdrop of a society that focused its discourse on our casualties in Lebanon.

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Reconnecting with reality

NOW Lebanon
New Opinion
31 May '10

Last week, the London Times reported that Hezbollah had been transferring weapons from secret arms depots in Syria to the party’s bases in Lebanon. It was the latest installment in a story that has been running since April and which has highlighted not only the heightened tension in an already-bristling region, but the voracity with which Hezbollah has rearmed after its 2006 war with Israel and the apparent inability of the Lebanese state to curb the party’s appetite for confrontation and conflict.

The ongoing story, along with NOW Lebanon’s constant editorials arguing that Hezbollah’s non-state activities are not only criminal but that they will ultimately visit death and destruction upon the nation, have created an ongoing cyber polemic. The debate is occurring among those who oppose Hezbollah’s activities because they lie outside the state and yet have consequences that will involve the state up its national hilt, and those who, for political, moral or religious reasons, believe in the party’s right to keep Lebanon teetering on the edge of an apocalyptic cauldron.

“It doesn’t matter if the decision of war was taken in the parliament building or in Damascus or Tehran since the majority of the Lebanese citizens and the majority of the parliament will back Hezbollah's militarism,” commented one NOW Lebanon reader. Another declared “Those who support the resistance will die for Sayyed Hassan. You will have to kill us all, before Hezbollah is gone.”

It is easy to lose touch in cyberspace, to get enmeshed in political and sectarian one-upmanship and forget of the dangerous reality of the times in which we live.

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Hezbollah's 'Disneyland'

Sunday's field trip included a workshop on how to handle weapons,

close contact with Hezbollah fighters who spoke of their exploits in

the face of the 'enemy' (Israel) and a reenactment of battles at

the border village of Maroun el-Rass, where some of the fiercest

fighting took place during the 2006 war. -- PHOTO: AFP

AFP
The Straits Times
18 May '10
Posted before Chag

LEBANON - TEN years after Israel pulled out, south Lebanon is solidly controlled by Hezbollah which is even organising 'jihadist tours' along one of the most tense borders in the Middle East.

About 500 young men and woman, both Christian and Muslim, took part at the weekend in the latest such field trip intended to garner support for the militant group which is considered one of Israel's fiercest enemies. 'We want to familiarise young people with the achievements of the resistance and show them how unjust the Israeli occupation was and how glorious the liberation by the Islamic resistance,' said Mohammed Taleb, 23, a Hezbollah militant who is studying environmental science.

The tour took place just days before May 25, which marks the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon following a 22-year occupation. It also comes amid Israeli charges that Hezbollah, which fought a devastating war with the Jewish state in 2006, was stockpiling sophisticated weapons in preparation for a new conflict.

Sunday's field trip included a workshop on how to handle weapons, close contact with Hezbollah fighters who spoke of their exploits in the face of the 'enemy' (Israel) and a reenactment of battles at the border village of Maroun el-Rass, where some of the fiercest fighting took place during the 2006 war. Also on the 'jihadist tour' is a stop at Beaufort Castle, which was a garrison headquarters and the nerve centre of Israel's occupation.

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The Lebanon War's Toy Story

Honest Reporting/Backspin
04 January '10

Errol Morris of the NY Times Opinionator blog discusses with AP photographer Ben Curtis about toys appearing in photos from the Second Lebanon War. The interview was prompted by Slublog's 2006 post, The Passion of the Toys.

A child’s toy lies amidst broken glass from the shattered windows of an apartment block near those that were demolished by Israeli air strikes in Tyre, Southern Lebanon, Monday, August 7th, 2006.

It's worth reading because it gives a sense of the dynamic between photographers on the scene and their editors back home, what happens when a war zone is saturated with cameramen, and how photographers choose shots like this.

ERROL MORRIS: The good example, of course, is the Mickey Mouse photograph, because it is not a photograph that has been manipulated in Photoshop. And yet people find it problematic, regardless. People look at the photograph and think, “They’re trying to blame this on Israel, saying the country killed innocent children.” And then comes the follow-up thought: “How dare they! They’re anti-Semitic,” and so on and so forth. And my own two cents of opinion on posing is that often we say a picture is posed if the photograph suggests a view that we don’t like, regardless of what the intention of the photographer might have been and regardless of whether it has or has not been manipulated.

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Has Hizbullah Changed?

Dr. Shimon Shapira
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
15 December 09

Has Hizbullah Changed? The 7th Hizbullah General Conference and Its Continued Ideology of Resistance

Some Western analysts believe the political manifesto published in the wake of Hizbullah's 7th General Conference at the end of November 2009 represented a fundamental change in Hizbullah policy.

While its link to Iran as the ultimate source of authority was not mentioned in this or any previous political manifesto, this link - that is part of Hizbullah's essence - appeared in the "Open Letter" (Resala Maftuha) of 1985, which remains the founding manifesto of Hizbullah and continues to serve as the movement's ideological basis.

The preface to the latest manifesto describes the decline of the United States as the sole superpower and the retreat of American power throughout the world. In reflection of these global changes, Hizbullah offers its resistance to Israel and the United States as the model for emulation throughout the world.

Hizbullah's vigorous insistence that it retain an army of its own that does not heed the authority of the state but rather the representative of Iran's leader in Lebanon makes a mockery of the clauses in the political manifesto about Lebanon being the eternal homeland. Furthermore, by building a state-like system parallel to that of the Lebanese state, and one that relies on aid and funding from Iran and Syria, Hizbullah does not contribute to the strengthening of Lebanon.

The decision of the Lebanese government to recognize the continued legitimate existence of Hizbullah's armed militia demonstrates less a case that Hizbullah underwent a process of "Lebanonization," but rather that the Lebanese state has undergone a process of "Hizbullazation."

Hizbullah's alleged move toward pragmatism is based to a large extent on an Iranian decision to create a new atmosphere in Lebanon that will allow it to work unmolested. Iran is looking for strict silence in the Lebanese arena in order to enable Hizbullah to reconstruct its strategic capabilities (including long-range rockets and missiles) in Lebanon in order to make use of these capabilities at a time to be determined by Tehran.

Hizbullah wound up its clandestine 7th General Conference at the end of November 2009 that took place and lasted about four months. Hassan Nasrallah was again chosen to be Hizbullah's general secretary and, as with previous conferences, the movement published a political manifesto. Some Western analysts believe the manifesto represented a fundamental change in Hizbullah policy. Indeed, a few days after it was proclaimed, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband told the Beirut Daily Star, "carefully considered contact with Hizbullah's politicians, including its MPs, will best advance our objective of the group rejecting violence to play a constructive role in Lebanese politics."1 Later, British spokesmen denied they had changed their policy toward Hizbullah.

Hizbullah's 6th General Conference was convened in 2004 and, according to the movement's bylaws, the 7th General Conference was to have convened in 2007. However, due to the Second Lebanon War and the debates and internal struggles that erupted in its wake within Hizbullah, together with the death of Hizbullah military commander Imad Mughniyeh in a car bombing in Damascus in February 2008, the conference was postponed twice and was finally convened in 2009.2

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