Nuclear Terrorism: Threat to the Public or to Credibility?

Jonathan Schachter, Yoel Guzansky,
and Yoram Schweitzer
INSS
Insight No. 178
28 April 28 '10

(Decent article discussing possibilities, but more importantly, where the focus should be at this time. Y.)

During a recent trip to Prague, where he signed a new arms control treaty with Russia, President Barack Obama declared that nuclear terrorism is “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” Though the unique destructive power of nuclear arms justifies his concern regarding their spread and potential use, this grave assessment regarding the imminent threat of nuclear terrorism does not appear to stand up to scrutiny, and might even set the stage for weaker international non-proliferation resolve in the future.

Threat comprises both intent and capability. Analysts are nearly unanimous in their evaluation that al-Qaeda has demonstrated the former through its public statements and its efforts to secure both nuclear materials and religious rulings supporting their nefarious use. Documentary evidence of the group’s interest reportedly was found in Afghanistan in the years immediately after 9/11. This is significant, for not only is the intent to cause large numbers of casualties consistent with the philosophy and modus operandi of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, but very few other groups have ever demonstrated any interest in or willingness to acquire nuclear weapons and bear their real and potential associated costs.

Capability is another matter. According to the RAND Corporation’s Brian Jenkins, who first wrote about terrorists “going nuclear” in 1975, “Usama bin Laden certainly wants a nuclear weapon. He’s been trying for the last 15 years to get a nuclear weapon. There’s no doubt that if he had one, he would use it. Al-Qaeda frequently talks about nuclear weapons….But the fact is there is no evidence that al-Qaeda has nuclear weapons or that it has the material or knowledge to make nuclear weapons.”

If al-Qaeda has neither the weapons nor the ability to make them, the concern remains regarding the group’s acquisition of a weapon from a nuclear state, either through cooperation or following regime collapse. Here the question centers mainly on Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. For over 30 years Iran has provided shelter to and trained, equipped, and dispatched terrorists to strike at American and Israeli targets. Is it likely that a nuclear Iran would usher al-Qaeda or Hizbollah into the nuclear club as well?

The evidence suggests not. First, despite reports of al-Qaeda members finding refuge and passing safely through Iran, the tensions and mistrust between Shiite Iran and Sunni al-Qaeda would almost certainly be a deal breaker. Second, and perhaps most importantly, we have seen no evidence that state sponsors of terrorism have ever provided terrorist groups with non-conventional weapons. The US has designated Iran and Syria, for example, as state sponsors of terrorism for more than a quarter of a century, and both states are known to have large stocks of chemical weapons (which they appear to be developing together; according to Janes, in July 2007 an accident at a joint Iranian-Syrian chemical weapons plant in Aleppo led to dozens of deaths). Nevertheless, none of the terrorist groups sponsored by these two states has ever carried out an attack using these weapons, nor is there evidence that they’ve been equipped to do so.

(Read full insight)

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Why U.S. Help Doesn't Bring Love

Barry Rubin

The Rubin Report

18 August 09

I was attacked on a Pakistani blog for my article about how a recent poll shows only a 1 percent rise in the popularity of the United States since President Barack Obama took office along with other results showing how deep extremism and anti-Americanism is in that country.

My writing about this relates to a larger discussion about how the idea that Obama is wildly popular almost everywhere in the world and this has valuable policy implications is simply wrong on both counts.

What’s important is not the blog, which is obscure, or the criticism, which is tendentious. But the main three arguments, which are so often heard, are worth refuting briefly.

One is that the United States should not receive any positive response for its huge aid to Pakistan because it is merely hiring the Pakistani military for certain specific services.

This is something often heard . Aid either shores up a regime which the critic doesn’t like or it is merely serving U.S. purposes. But the money going to Pakistan is to fight revolutionary Islamists who also subvert Pakistani society and cause significant bloodshed. So in fact, the aid directly does benefit Pakistan and its interests.

Indirectly, of course, by strengthening the Pakistani military with money and equipment, the United States also creates a situation in which Pakistan could more easily attack India or brazenly sponsor terrorism against its neighbor and then defy its pressures to stop doing so. Similarly, U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority in terms of military equipment and training might some day be used to fight Israel.

At least, donors should be aware if and when the provision of lavish aid (not to mention diplomatic support and other beneficial behavior) will bring no return of popularity or willingness to cooperate with itself.

The second argument is the old one that Pakistanis cannot hate America when they are eager to get a green card to work there or to buy its products.

Why, however, are people in countries like Pakistan or Arabic-speaking countries so quick to argue that America hates them, which is precisely what the poll on Pakistan shows? One equivalent argument would be to say that if American tourists would like to go to a country or eat at an ethnic restaurant representing its cuisine this proves they really love that country. China, you’re in great shape!

The third argument is that U.S. policy has always been totally pro-Indian. (Indians have their own idea on that point.) It is easy to show that the United States has often side with Pakistan even at times when this was unpopular to do so (as in the Bangladesh crisis, or ignoring Pakistan’s close involvement in bloody massacres in India).

A key point here is that U.S. attempts to show how sympathetic it is to Islam or to a given country; no matter how hard it tries to distance itself from that country’s enemies—as with Obama Administration efforts in the current Middle East—will not bring much return.

Consider that for 16 years, the PLO, Fatah, and the Palestinian Authority has been a U.S. client. There is no pro-American aspect of their policies, however, or sense of gratitude. America is still the enemy and they—along with other Arabs—will tell you how America completely backs Israel and does nothing for the Palestinians.

Attitudes are simply fixed in place to a large extent, bubbling up from an anti-democratic political culture, manipulated by governments, or even set by historic experiences. That was, after all, the point of the article.

For a fuller discussion of these issues and of anti-Americanism in general see here and look at our book, Hating America: A History.

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