Syria Reimposes Its Patronage over Lebanon

H. Varulkar/N. Mozes
MEMRI
24 May '10

Introduction

"...[Syria's] political return to Lebanon is taking place slowly but surely, by means of its allies in [this country], whose numbers are growing and whose voice is becoming stronger. It is regaining its influence [over Lebanon] quietly and without military [force], placing more [emphasis] on diplomacy than it did in the past..."[1]

Thus columnist Emil Khouri described the reality in Lebanon in Al-Nahar, a Lebanese daily which is close to the March 14 Forces.

Five years after a Western-Arab-Lebanese front emerged to oppose Syria's presence in Lebanon, forcing Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to withdraw the military and security forces that had been there since 1976 and had provided the military backing for Syria's control of Lebanon, Syria seems to be regaining its control over Lebanon. This is coming about with the backing – or at least with the acquiescence – of the very forces that five years ago led the campaign for the Syrian withdrawal.

While as of this writing Syria has not redeployed its army in Lebanon, its return to the country seems to be taking place not quite as Khouri describes – that is, not strictly by diplomatic means – but as Ghassan Sa'ud, columnist for the pro-Syrian Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar writes: "Syria is reorganizing its affairs [in Lebanon], drawing a clear line between those who are with it and those who are against it, leaving no room to maneuver."[2]

In this endeavor, Syria is proceeding gradually, keeping an eye on the reactions in Lebanon and outside it. Syrian officials, headed by President Assad himself, are careful to declare their support for, and recognition of, Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, citing as evidence the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the countries. However, these statements and measures appear to be mere formalities, to allay the fears of those who oppose the return of Syria's patronage over Lebanon. In practice, Syria is setting an increasing number of conditions and demands for its opponents in Lebanon, and for various regional and international elements, with the aim of consolidating its control over the country. For example, the pro-Syrian Al-Akhbar reported recently that Syria is demanding that Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'd Al-Hariri reaffirm agreements that the two countries signed during the period of Syria's patronage over Lebanon,[3] thus bringing back the situation that prevailed prior to the 2005 Syrian military withdrawal.

Recently, Syria has stepped up the pace of its return to Lebanon, as its confidence increases due to greater international openness towards it during this past year, and the international community's tacit consent to its involvement in Lebanon.[4] Other possible factors in the acceleration of its activity in Lebanon are the increasing tension between Syria and Israel, the anticipation of an imminent international decision on Iran's nuclear dossier, and the release of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) conclusions on the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri.

This paper will review how Syria is reclaiming its patronage over Lebanon.

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As if they’d never left

NOW Lebanon
New Opinion
26 April '10

(Another insightful article from NOW Lebanon.)

Five years ago today, after a brief ceremony in the border town of Aanjar that tried to paint a patina of respect on a total of 29 years of military and security “presence”, the last Syrian soldier left Lebanese soil. Until that moment, and for more than a decade after the Lebanese civil war ended, it was hard for first-time visitors to Lebanon to determine who actually ran the country.

From the moment they landed at Beirut Airport to when they reached their hotels, tourists would see that the walls and roads of Beirut were dotted with portraits of former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, sometimes alongside those of his then-Lebanese counterpart, Elias Hrawi, but in many instances alone.

Even more mystifying to the neophyte would have been the three days of mourning for Assad’s son and heir, Basil, who was killed in a car accident in Damascus in January 1994. Soon after, a statue of Basil in uniform on one of his beloved horses was erected at the entrance to the Bekaa town of Chtoura.

And all the while the Syrian army lived in abandoned buildings and controlled the strategic intersections around Beirut and the rest of Lebanon. There was very little respect or courtesy from the occupying army. Shopkeepers would be careful not to fall foul of their neighbors, while at the checkpoints, petty extortion was practiced on commercial vehicles. Elsewhere anxiety was added to humiliation as drivers would be “asked” to give lifts to Syrian soldiers. Then there were the summons for those who dared speak out against the presence. They could range from a verbal reprimand to abuse and intimidation that could last for days.

The events leading up to the withdrawal have been well documented. Rafik Hariri, the man who had come to represent post-war Lebanon, had been murdered in an outrageous assassination that took the lives of 21 others, and this time the Lebanese were not going to take it like they had with previous killings. They took to the streets, blaming Syria for the murder. This time, with the US army camped in Iraq and a US administration that would not brook any insolence from the region’s despots, there was no crackdown on the huge and unprecedented demonstration of people power, arguably the biggest in modern Arab history.

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A Weather Vane Shifts in Lebanon

Max Boot
Contentions/Commentary
15 March '10

Walid Jumblatt is one of the wiliest and least predictable politicians in the Middle East. A canny survivor, he has led the tiny Druze community in Lebanon since the late 1970s. He is usually described as a warlord, but he is also the leader of his own political party, the Progressive Socialists. Over the years, he has been aligned both with and against Syria and has taken aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States. He is a charming host and raconteur who, as I discovered during a visit to his Beirut home last year with a group of American journalists, is not afraid of offering outspoken opinions on most subjects under the sun.

In 2007, for example, he publicly referred to Bashar al-Assad — the Syrian dictator and son of the previous Syrian dictator, Hafez al-Assad, who was most likely responsible for the assassination of Walid’s father, Kamal, in 1977 — as a “monkey, snake and a butcher.” Now Jumblatt is saying, in effect, oops, I didn’t mean it:

“In a moment of anger I said inappropriate and illogical comments against him (Assad). Can Syria overcome this page and open a new page? I don’t know,” he told al-Jazeera television.

This is one of the more notable attempts at a retraction in recent history, but, aside from its comic value, it does have some geopolitical significance.

(Read full post)
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March 14 Has Not Stepped Up To The Plate

Ghassan Karam
Special to Ya Libnan
13 February '10

One of the most common definitions of a state is the one given by the great sociologist Max Weber: “it is that organization that has monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. Obviously not all states in the world meet the simple conditions set in that functional definition. A sovereign state is obviously the one that combines the de facto and the de jure aspects of that definition by exercising total control over its territory.

Unfortunately there are some “quasi” states in the world where the governmental institutions pretend to have power when in effect they do not. Unfortunately there are many such cases in the world of government setups similar to those in Afghanistan where the official government enjoys international recognition but is not capable of either promoting its policies or even of governing its territory. The Taliban’s present such a formidable threat to the government in all aspects that they might as well be viewed as the real power in the land

Lebanon is even in a worse shape. Hezbollah is the real power behind the thrown. Not much, if anything, can be accomplished in Lebanon if Hezbollah’s’ approval is not forthcoming, not even the privatization of the cellular telephone network that is falling behind the technological developments in the world and in the region as we speak. Nothing gets done in Lebanon if Hezbollah does not permit it. But the power of Hezbollah on the Lebanese scene goes far beyond that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In Lebanon Hezbollah is part of the official cabinet that it openly opposes.

Most would agree to describe the official Afghanistan government of Mr. Karzai as a de jure state while that of the Taliban as a defacto one. But in Lebanon it is worst than this. Hezbollah and its allies are the defacto government and they are the ones that practically dictate all what passes as a dejure government

(Read full article)
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Lebanese unity? Not at the point of a Hizbollah gun

Emile Hokayem
The National (UAE)
17 December 09

(Oh, who are the people in your neighborhood? ... Sesame Street)

After six months of political drama and wrangling, Lebanon has a government. Congratulations poured in from abroad as soon as cabinet proposals by the prime minister, Saad Hariri, won overwhelming parliamentary support.

On a delicate visit to Washington, the president, Michel Suleiman, felt confident enough to promise a sceptical audience of US officials and Lebanese Americans that this national unity government would usher in a period of stability.

In fact, what happened between the elections in June and the formation of the new government was the political weakening of the March 14 coalition that nominally leads the cabinet, and the erosion of its tenets; from delineating borders with Syria to bringing suspects in the assassinations of anti-Syrian figures before an international tribunal. Mr Suleiman did not even raise these issues in his discussions in Washington.

The reasons for this collapse will leave a bitter taste in the mouths of those who hoped this tiny and volatile country could establish full sovereignty and authority over its own territory and people, and worked so hard towards that end.

(Read full article)

Why is the Other Side Winning? Lebanon's New Government As a Case Study

Barry Rubin
The Rubin Report
11 November 09

The moderate March 14 movement, in the words of the New York Times, won “a clear victory” in Lebanon’s June elections, while the Hizballah-led alliance suffered a “loss.”

Why, then will the forces that won a majority, again in the phrasing of the Times, “have little chance to dictate the agenda?”

On the surface, things are bad enough. The March 14 movement will have fifteen cabinet seats, Hizballah and its friends (all of whom are allied because they are clients of Iran and Syria) get ten, and the other five will be controlled by President Michel Suleiman “who has struggled to maintain neutrality,” says theTimes.

Now to the fine print which makes things look far worse.

Suleiman is Syria’s man. That’s why he got the job. Almost all the time, and perhaps all the time, he will back the Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah line.

Then there’s Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader, who up until recently was the toughest, bravest March 14 leader. Reading the writing on the wall, he has jumped ship and tried to switch sides, at least to some extent. So that tilts the situation even more in favor of Hizballah-Iran-Syria.

But why is this happening, why do those who won the elections have to give veto power to those who lost? Why will this government be unable to disarm Hizballah, stop arms’ smuggling across its borders, prosecute those responsible for terrorist attacks within Islam, prevent Hizballah from attacking Israel and thus dragging Lebanon into war whenever it wants, and be too friendly to the West?

On the surface, of course, this passivity is necessary to maintain the peace. Lebanon has always had a weak government, and the specter of civil war hangs over the country based on past experience.

The full answer, however, is two-fold and these factors interlock.

The first point is that Iran and Syria give lavish support to their side. They provide lots of money, weapons, and political support. They virtually never betray their friends. They are strong and ready to intimidate their enemies.

And the second point regards the opposite side: The United States and Europe don’t subsidize their “clients.” U.S. aid money goes to the Lebanese army which is arguably now under Iranian-Syrian control if it came to a crisis. Their political support is unreliable, either because they don’t do anything or they actually make concessions to Hizballah, Iran, and Syria. They usually do betray their friends, are apologetic, and prone to engage in appeasement.

Quick, who would you depend on to keep you alive politically and personally if you were a Lebanese politician?

If the March 14 coalition tried to disarm Hizballah’s militia, stop it from controlling the south, block it from attacking Israel, interdict all the arms’ smuggling from Syria, or do lots of other things, Iran, Syria, and Hizballah along with their other local allies would smite them with a mighty blow.

But if Hizballah took over neighborhoods, ignored the government, made fools out of the UN forces which are supposedly policing them (or even attack them in a deniable way), the United States and Europe would do nothing.

Is it really so hard to understand, then, why things are going the way they are in Lebanon, or in the Middle East generally for that matter?

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Analysis: Coalition agreement not withstanding, Hizbullah will continue to hold sway in Lebanon

Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, as a famous Chinese leader once said. In Lebanon, the guns are in the hands of Hizbullah.

Jonathan Spyer
JPost/Opinion
08 November 09

Following statements from both government and opposition sides in Lebanon over the weekend, it now looks likely that Prime Minister-elect Saad Hariri will announce the formation of a new governing coalition in the next few days.

The announcement that a deal has been reached on a unity government was made by the Hizbullah-led March 8 opposition movement after a meeting on Friday.

The details of the deal have not yet been made clear, but it appears that the main stumbling blocks have been overcome.

The formation of a new government will bring to an end four months of political paralysis in Lebanon, following the victory of the pro-western March 14 coalition in general elections in June.

However, the new government will have no bearing on the key political fact looming over Lebanon today: namely, the existence of a parallel state maintained by Hizbullah, which makes its decisions without consulting the nominal rulers of the country.

The deadlock regarding the formation of the government was itself related to the agenda of the Hizbullah parallel state. It is worth remembering that agreement for the formula of cabinet appointments was reached in July. But this agreement solved little.

Hariri was determined to prevent the opposition from obtaining veto power in the new government. To exercise a veto over cabinet decisions, the opposition needed to control at least 11 portfolios in the 30-member cabinet - that is, one-third plus one of the cabinet seats.

In July, both sides accepted a formula of 15 portfolios for the March 14 coalition, 10 for the opposition, and five to be appointed by President Michel Suleiman.

The key issue then became the identity of the ministers to be appointed by the president. If only one of them were to be inclined toward the opposition, this would mean that Hizbullah would effectively have kept the veto it exercised before June. Since the final names have not yet been announced, it is too soon to draw any firm conclusions in this regard.

It looks likely, however, that Hariri has compromised in another key area.

Hariri announced after the election that he was determined to keep the Telecommunications Ministry for his party. The Hizbullah-led opposition was equally determined to obtain this portfolio for themselves.

Hizbullah maintains a large-scale independent communications network which is an essential part of its military stance vis a vis Israel. Its determination to keep this network away from government scrutiny was one of the factors that triggered the fighting in Beirut in May 2008.
(Continue to read...)