...Apparently aware that, as currently formulated, the Arab Peace Initiative is too pernicious to be approved by the Israeli public, Commanders for Israel's Security tries to preempt criticisms of its acceptance of the so called "peace initiative" by adding a proviso that it should be adjusted "to accommodate Israel's security and demographic needs, as a basis for negotiation." But suggestions that "adjustments" might be made were rapidly and resolutely rejected by both the Saudis, who authored the initiative, and the Arab League, which endorsed it. And why wouldn't they? For as Commanders for Israel's Security's proposal clearly demonstrates, continued Arab intransigence is sure to engender further Israeli compliance.
Martin Sherman..
Israel Hayom..
19 June '16..
Link: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=16447
A comprehensive Israeli policy declaration accepting, in principle, the Arab Peace Initiative, with requisite adjustments to accommodate Israel's security and demographic needs, as a basis for negotiation. -- Key political measure in plan titled "Security First," proposed by Commanders for Israel's Security, which claims to "improve Israel's security and international standing"
The Arab Peace Initiative does not need changing or adjusting, it is on the table as is. ... Why should we change the Arab Peace Initiative? I believe that the argument the Arab Peace Initiative needs to be watered down in order to accommodate the Israelis is not the right approach. -- Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, Paris, June 3, 2016.
Last week I began a critical analysis of a plan put forward by a group calling itself "Commanders for Israel's Security," comprising over 200 former senior security officers and officials.
I argued that the plan, which purports to offer a formula "to extricate Israel from the current dead end and to improve its security situation and international standing," is a deeply flawed policy prescription, both in terms of the political principles on which it is based and the practical details it presents. As such, it is highly unlikely to achieve its own stated objectives. Indeed, it is far more likely to precipitate precisely the opposite outcomes, exacerbating the very dangers it claims it will attenuate.
To recap briefly, the major political components that comprise the plan call for Israel to:
(a) Proclaim, unilaterally, that it forgoes any claim to sovereignty beyond the yet-to-be-completed security barrier, which, in large measure, coincides with the pre-1967 Green Line, adjusted to include several major settlement blocks adjacent to those lines; but,
(b) Leave the IDF deployed there -- until some "acceptable alternative security arrangement" is found -- presumably the emergence of a yet-to-be-located pliant Palestinian Arab entity that will pledge to recognize Israel as the Jewish nation-state; and
(c) Embrace the Saudi Peace Plan subject to certain -- but significantly, unspecified -- changes, which the Arabs/Saudis recently resolutely refused to consider.
Learning the lesson of Gaza; ignoring the lesson of southern Lebanon
Commanders for Israel's Security claims that it has learned the lesson of the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, when the IDF evacuated the territory and allowed the Islamist Hamas to take over. Accordingly, their plan "calls for the IDF to remain in the West Bank and retain complete security control until a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians ushers in alternative concrete, sustainable security arrangements."
So while Commanders for Israel's Security may have indeed learned the lesson of Gaza in 2005, it seems to have forgotten the lesson of Lebanon in 2000.
Indeed, as I underscored last week, the combination of the first two elements -- the forswearing of claims to sovereignty over Judea and Samaria on the one hand and the continued deployment of the IDF in that territory on the other -- replicate precisely the same conditions that prevailed in southern Lebanon until the hasty retreat by the IDF in 2000. This unbecoming flight was orchestrated by then-Prime Minister, former IDF Chief of Staff and Israel's most decorated soldier, Ehud Barak, under intense pressure from left-leaning organizations to extricate the IDF from the "Lebanese quagmire" and bring our boys back home. Thus abandoned to the control of Hezbollah, the area was swiftly converted into a formidable arsenal, bristling with weaponry capable of hitting almost all major Israeli cities.
Now What?
9 months ago











