IMRA Weekly Commentary..
31 October '13..
What with Hamas at odds with Egypt and its Iranian benefactor as it faces domestic challenges as well, it may not necessarily serve Israel's interests to launch an operation that could very well galvanize support for this radical terror semi-state.
It would, however, be a terrible mistake to only start to seriously think about the goals of such an operation when circumstances require decisions within hours.
Ever since the retreat from the Gaza Strip the goal of each Israeli operation has been limited to restoring "quiet for quiet".
To be clear, restoration of "quiet for quiet" does not require significantly reducing the offensive capabilities of the Palestinians, nor does it require that the Palestinians halt their programs to enhance their military capabilities.
"Quiet for quiet" only means that the Palestinians stop shooting (or limit the extent of their shooting) and we stop shooting (or limit ourselves to minor tit-for-tat responses).
"Quiet for quiet" is a very popular goal for policymakers both because of its simplicity and low requirements for success. It also lets the leadership of both sides claim some form of victory as both the Israelis and the Palestinians can argue that the restoration of "quiet for quiet" is proof that their strength has deterred the enemy.
The downside is that "quiet for quiet" facilitates the ongoing enhancement of the military capabilities of the Palestinians in Gaza.
In the first round after the retreat from the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians were equipped with crude rockets with small payloads and short ranges launched using methods that were subject to relatively easy monitoring.
Today, with almost all the smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egyptian Sinai closed and relations with Iran seriously impaired, a burgeoning Gazan domestic military industry is producing rockets that can reach Tel Aviv from concealed launch sites. At the same time huge resources have been devoted to establishing a network of attack tunnels against Israel along with a massive network of tunnels, bunkers and underground launching pads in the Gaza Strip.
What we face today is not what we will face tomorrow.
And what we will face in another year or two or three will dwarf the challenge we face today.
Of course, at the same time we are also enhancing both our defensive and offensive technologies.
I am not suggesting that we rush to conclusions.
Just that we take a hard look at where we are today and where we can reasonably expect to find ourselves in the coming years.
My guess is that the very painful conclusion may be that the goal for the next round is to destroy the monster that has developed since the retreat and create circumstances and conditions that prevent a repeat of this situation.
This is not something that can be seriously discussed as the decision makers are already huddled over tactical operations maps.
It is something that requires many months of thinking – preferably including simulations with a "red team" of the best and brightest playing out the Arab sides.
We can ill afford to trap ourselves into being limited to only kicking the can down the road.
Link: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=62207
Updates throughout the day at http://calevbenyefuneh.
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