The Time Has Come for Israel to Make a Decision on Gaza - by Jonathan Ariel

For over a decade, Israel has avoided deciding whether its interests are better served by maintaining the current “two Palestinian states” status quo, or by seeing Gaza rejoin the Palestinian Authority. The result is an untenable, chronic-crisis situation that empowers Mahmoud Abbas and is a lose-lose for Israel.

Jonathan Ariel..
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,001..
09 November '18..

In January 2006, the residents of the Palestinian Authority (PA) went to the polls on the insistence of the Bush administration, which wanted elections to be held there as part of its policy to democratize the Middle East. The Americans’ thinking was that the Palestinians, who had, by Arab standards, a relatively large and well-educated middle class, were good candidates for democratization. The hope was that if the Palestinians, who were traditional lightweights in the Arab world, could successfully democratize their society, it would be a catalyst for similarly successful democratization of the Arab world’s heavyweights, such as Iraq, Egypt, and Syria.

Both Israel and several Arab states, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, recommended postponing the elections on the grounds that there was a real danger that Hamas would win. They made it clear to the US administration that Hamas, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, promoted a radical jihadist agenda. The Americans insisted the elections go ahead, and since neither Israel nor the Arab states wanted to oppose the US, they acquiesced in what they viewed as a bad decision.

The elections took place. Sure enough, Hamas won, giving the Muslim Brotherhood its first electoral victory in an Arab state (the AKP, which regards itself as the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, has been in power in Turkey since 2003). This event sowed winds of change that would eventually develop into the “Arab Spring,” an erroneous moniker if ever there was one.

Fatah, which had ruled the PA since its inception in May 1994, and before that had dominated Palestinian politics since the late 1960s, refused to peacefully hand over power. A year after the election, Hamas’s militia (Izz ad-Din Qassam) took over Gaza by force, killing or expelling all PA forces. Since then Gaza has been a de facto separate political entity.

Israel has never decided whether its interests would be better served by perpetuating and formalizing the two-Palestinian-state status quo, or by seeing Gaza revert to the status quo ante. For over a decade, Jerusalem has limited itself to tactical responses. When Hamas aggression reaches unacceptable levels, the IDF mounts limited military incursions aimed at containing Hamas, and assiduously avoids formulating a coherent strategy.

(Continue to Full Post)

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Observation: Israel's New Gaza Policy: Winners, Losers and is PM Netanyahu Still on the Gangplank?

Dr. Aaron Lerner
IMRA
20 June '10

The winners from Israel's new Gaza policy liberalizing the system by which civilian goods enter Gaza:

- The residents of the Gaza Strip: to the extent that goods are cheaper via Israel than the tunnels (some high tax items like cigarettes aren't)

- The PA in Ramallah: benefit from the increased VAT and duty collected by Israel on goods transshipped via Ashdod to the Gaza Strip

- Israeli suppliers

The losers:

Hamas and the Gaza tunnel industry: from the drop in revenues and the possibility that access to construction and other material will be wrested from the control of Hamas.

Isn't Hamas a winner? There was no indication that the previous policy was going to either bring down the Hamas regime (they aren't shy about repressive measures) or cause them to release Gilad Shalit. If anything, the change in policy marks an end to the fantasy that such measures could bring Hamas down. A fantasy that served to paper over the glaring absence of a clear vision as to what Israel should do about Hamas when the opportunity presents itself.

Like do what? Like actually decimate the Hamas leadership (if the IDF isn't able to do this in such a small enclosed and mostly flat area if that is the goal that is set for a campaign then we have problems considerably greater than Hamas to worry about).

Suggesting that Israeli soldiers might give their lives so that Fatah takes over the Gaza Strip?

No. Suggesting that Israeli soldiers might die sending Hamas terrorists to Paradise. What initially happens after that may very well be of secondary importance. After all, the same troops that dispatch Hamas terrorists can also battle Fatah terrorists if and when it comes to that.

Will today's decision take Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu off of President Obama's gangplank?

This may be up to Netanyahu as much as it is up to Obama.

Look for signs of the gangplank at the upcoming visit to Washington"

- Will Netanyahu say something about a Palestinian state that reduces his remaining centimeter of wiggle room to a millimeter?

- Will Netanyahu say something destructively ambiguous about post freeze settlement construction?

A suggestion: The best way for Binyamin Netanyahu to demonstrate that he doesn't feel he is on the gangplank (or in the penalty box) is by showing this in the discussions held in preparation for the meeting. And the simplest way to make this clear is by putting the release of Jonathan Pollard on the agenda. Not as one of 20 talking points on a list to rattle through at a meeting but as someone to come back on the plane with.

President Obama can't release Gilad Shalit. But he can free Pollard with the stroke of a pen. Yes, there are some very senior people who repeat the mantra that the American security establishment simply won't let it happen. But we aren't talking about an American president who takes marching orders from the security establishment. If anything, all the characteristics of Obama's method of operation that may otherwise be problematic actually set the stage for him to sign off on the release.

Releasing Pollard is one of the few moves, that President Obama can make for Israel's benefit that does not require an expensive counterbalancing gesture to the Arabs.

Here's hoping that our prime minister does indeed demonstrate, when he visits the White House, that he is off the gangplank.

Because if you stay too long on the gangplank you can ultimately find that instead of stepping off you are pushed off.

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