For those who are home, and for those who are on the way. For those who support the historic and just return of the land of Israel to its people, forever loyal to their inheritance, and its restoration.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Missionary man in Damascus
Tony Badran
NOW Lebanon
23 March '10
Last week, the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the nomination of Robert Ford as the new ambassador to Syria. While Ford’s confirmation still awaits a full Senate hearing, which has yet to be scheduled, the nominee’s statements painted a problematic picture of what the Obama administration’s Syria policy is premised on.
Despite repetition by administration officials that they are “under no illusions” when approaching Syria, comments made at the hearing betrayed a line of thinking focused on what the administration believes Syria’s “real interests” to be, rather than what Syria sees them to be. This was evident in the discussion of Syria’s relationship with Iran and Iraq.
The tone was set by committee chairman Senator John Kerry, a leading advocate for a new Syria policy: “I believe [Syrian President Bashar al-Assad] understands that his country’s long-term interests... are not well served by aligning Syria with a revolutionary Shiite [sic] regime in Iran and its terrorist clients.” This is the driving logic behind Obama’s Syria policy: the old – and repeatedly failed – objective of prying Syria away from Iran.
Ford echoed this line in his prepared testimony: “[W]e must persuade Syria that neither Iran nor Hezbollah shares Syria’s long-term strategic interest in… peace.” Paradoxically, Ford followed this assertion by expressing uncertainty as to “whether the Syrians are truly interested in negotiating that peace agreement with Israel.”
Such reasoning betrays an inability, or an unwillingness, to understand Syrian behavior spanning over 30 years; it also misconstrues the nature of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Tehran and Damascus’ relationship was never reactive and defensive, as is commonly held – a tactical convergence against common enemies such as Iraq. It was always based on the two states’ conception of their role in the region and their shared desire to shape events in the Middle East to their advantage.
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